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This thesis investigates the short-run performance of initial private placements on the Euronext 
Growth Oslo marketplace from 2016 until March 1, 2021. Initial private placements differ from 
initial public offerings (IPOs) by providing a simpler and faster way of issuing capital and list on 
a marketplace. From a novel data set of 74 initial private placements followed by listings, we 
confirm the existence of the underpricing phenomenon on Euronext Growth with an average 
market-adjusted initial return of 21.43% and an average market-adjusted 30-day return of 32.15%.  
We formulate four hypotheses about underpricing on Euronext Growth and test these using four 
different dummy variables and relevant control variables. A wave of new companies portraying 
themselves as environmentally friendly and sustainable have been listed on Euronext Growth 
throughout 2020 and the beginning of 2021. They are often referred to as “green” companies. We 
classify the sample into green and non-green companies based on the main activities presented in 
the information document at the time of listing.  
Applying regression analysis, we find that companies classified as green have significantly higher 
underpricing, compared to non-green companies, even when controlling for company size, age and 
market volatility. Our finding counters previous research that has not found underpricing effects 
from green energy companies when controlling for other factors. However, green companies 
exhibiting higher underpricing is in line with previous IPO research indicating that firms with 
greater ex-ante uncertainty have higher underpricing. The 30-day underpricing factor is 
significantly larger than the initial underpricing factor, suggesting that the “green effect” may take 
some time to fully materialize. We also investigate whether tech companies, hot market issues in 
the post-covid period or issues with cornerstone investors, are associated with higher levels of 
underpricing, but find no evidence that any of these factors are consistently significant on the 
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Going public is one of the most important hallmarks in a company’s life. In recent years, the 
emergence of Euronext Growth as one of three marketplaces on the Oslo Stock Exchange has 
facilitated the process of going public with fewer barriers to entry. 
The Euronext Growth Oslo marketplace has had an extraordinarily active period in 2020 and the 
first quarter of 2021. A bulk of young companies in a growth phase, several of them tech companies 
and many considered to contribute towards a green economy, have listed on the marketplace. The 
listing process for most companies on the marketplace deviates from those on traditional stock 
exchanges since they usually do not perform a traditional initial public offering of shares. Instead, 
many companies have had an initial private offering or placement1, prior to listing. In this thesis, 
we will study underpricing from a sample of 74 companies that have listed following such an initial 
private placement on Euronext Growth Oslo since the beginning of the marketplace in 2016, until 
March 1, 2021. 
The phenomenon of underpricing, i.e., when the first day closing price is higher than the 
subscription price in the preceding offering, is a well-documented phenomenon in the IPO 
literature. If it is assumed that the issuer could have gotten a higher subscription price, underpricing 
“leaves money on the table” since the company does not capture all the price potential in its 
offering. Yet, the phenomenon has been empirically observed over long time periods and across 
different markets. Underpricing has spurred the interest of researchers resulting in a large 
emergence of IPO literature that accelerated from the 1980s and 1990s. 
Previous literature has shed light on many aspects of IPO underpricing, across different time 
periods and markets. At the time of writing, however, we are not aware of any existing studies on 
underpricing of companies listed after private placements. The aim of this thesis is to study 
underpricing among companies that have listed after conducting an initial private placement. The 
covid-19 outbreak in February-March 2020 marked a significant change in market conditions, with 
a subsequent wave of new companies being listed from the second half of 2020. Thus, we test 
whether the hot market period following the covid outbreak exhibits significantly higher 
 
1 The terms initial private offering and initial private placement will be used interchangeably in this thesis. 
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underpricing than the previous cold market period. A sizable portion of the new listings have been 
in the green and tech sphere. As these are typically young and rely on growth options, they have 
greater ex-ante uncertainty. Consequently, we test whether the green or tech label is positively 
related underpricing. Lastly, we study the effect on underpricing from cornerstone investments, in 
which investors pre-commit to purchase shares in the offering, and thus provide a signal for the 
quality of the issue to aftermarket investors. 
We find an average initial abnormal return of 21.43% in the 2016-2021 period for companies listed 
after private placements on Euronext Growth. The average 30-day abnormal return over the same 
period is 32.15% for the sample. This level of underpricing is high compared to previous studies 
of IPO underpricing in Norway (e.g. Emilsen, Pedersen & Sættem (1997), Fjesme (2011) and Ritter 
(2021)), which find IPO underpricing to be close to or less than 10%, depending on the time period. 
We further find that companies labelled as green have significantly higher underpricing, on average 
having 26.2 percentage points higher initial abnormal returns, controlling for company age and 
size. We find no evidence of significantly higher or lower underpricing for the hot market after the 
covid outbreak. We also do not find any evidence that companies labelled tech companies, or 




2. About Euronext Growth 
2.1 Brief history of Euronext Growth 
Euronext Growth was opened in January 2016 as part of the Oslo Stock Exchange, then by the 
name of Merkur Market. The marketplace changed its name from Merkur Market to Euronext 
Growth in September 2020, following Euronext’s acquisition of Oslo Børs VPS in 2019. It was 
intended as the marketplace on Oslo Stock Exchange best suited for small and medium sized 
companies. Fewer and less strict requirements and regulations were meant to attract companies 
aiming to raise public capital, while lacking the requirements for doing so on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange’s main marketplace.2  
Since the beginning in 2016 until March 1, 2021, a total of 104 companies have listed3 on Euronext 
Growth, while 19 companies have delisted. As of March 1, 2021, 85 companies were listed on the 
marketplace. Euronext Growth grew slowly in the first years after its opening before it expanded 
substantially in 2020 with 49 new companies being listed in that year.4 2020 marked a green shift 
on the Oslo Stock Exchange in general with the addition of many renewable energy and cleantech 
companies, especially on Euronext Growth. As of January 2021, so called green shares represented 
more than 10% of the total market capitalization on the Oslo Stock Exchange marketplaces 
(Euronext, 2021). 
2.2 Requirements for listing 
Euronext Growth is a multilateral trading facility and therefore largely falls outside the scope of 
the Norwegian Securities Trading Act (Abrahamsen & Sveen, 2021). The listing process on 
Euronext Growth is meant to facilitate an easily obtainable listing on the marketplace. It deviates 
from the main list’s listing process by having less strict requirements. 
The rules for listing on a Euronext marketplace are extensive. The exact rules for each marketplace 
can be found on Euronext’s website. The rules for the marketplaces are comprised of three 
components: i) Rulebook I: Harmonized rules for all Euronext marketplaces, ii) Rulebook II: 
 
2 Oslo Stock Exchange refers to both the market operator and the main marketplace. 
3 This includes one merger, one conversion of bonds to shares and five temporary listings of shares. 




Norwegian-specific rules, and iii) Notices: Processing rules and regulations for how the rulebooks 
shall be used. 
After Euronext’s acquisition of Oslo Stock Exchange in 2019, the rules were to a large extent 
harmonized across the three marketplaces in 2020 (Fagervik & Ausland, 2021). There have also 
been some prior changes since the beginning of the marketplace in 2016. We want to draw attention 
to the requirements that currently differ between the marketplaces and that we believe are most 
important for companies’ listing decision and potential underpricing effects. Table 1 gives an 
overview of notable differences in requirements for listing on the three marketplaces on the Oslo 




 Euronext Growth Euronext Expand Oslo Stock Exchange 
Spread of share 
ownership 
15% 25% 25% 
Number of 
shareholders 
30, with at least NOK 5000 
holding value at the time of 
admission. 
100, with at least NOK 
10,000 holding value at 
the time of admission. 
500, with at least NOK 
10,000 holding value at the 
time of admission. 
Market capitalization No requirement NOK 8 million NOK 300 million 
Financial history At least one financial report, 
either interim or annual. 
At least one financial 
report, either interim or 
annual. 
At least three years of 
financial history. 
Dispensation can be 
applied for. 
Prospectus Information document which 
is less extensive than an EEA 
compliant prospectus. 
Requires EEA compliant 
prospectus, supervised by 
the Norwegian Financial 
Supervisory Authority 
(Finanstilsynet). 
Requires EEA compliant 
prospectus, supervised by 





IFRS, Norwegian GAAP or 
other recognized accounting 
standards. 
IFRS IFRS 
Liquidity Not necessary to demonstrate 
sufficient liquidity for 12 
months of operations. 
Must demonstrate 
sufficient liquidity for 12 
months of operations. 
Must demonstrate 
sufficient liquidity for 12 
months of operations. 
Financial reporting Every half year. Four months 
publication deadline after the 
end of the financial period. 
Every half year. Three 
months publication 
deadline after the end of 
the financial period. 
Quarterly reporting is 
recommended. 
Every half year. Three 
months publication 
deadline after the end of the 
financial period. Quarterly 
reporting is recommended. 
Table 1: Listing requirements on Norwegian Euronext marketplaces. 
2.2.1 Share requirements 
One of the most prominent differences between the three marketplaces is the lower requirement 
for public ownership. At least 15% of the shares need to be spread out among the public on 
Euronext Growth, while the requirement is 25% on Euronext Expand and Oslo Stock Exchange. 
For private placements, given Rulebook I rule 3.1.1 and 3.2.1, an issuer on Euronext Growth needs 




2.2.2 Financial history and reporting 
Newly started companies can list on Euronext Growth. The main requirement is currently that 
companies seeking to be listed have two years of audited consolidated, or pro forma financial 
reports (Fagervik & Ausland, 2021). However, the stock exchange can provide an exemption for 
companies with at least one financial report at the time of listing, such that companies can list on 
Euronext Growth as soon as the first half year report has been written and revised. The requirement 
of financial history is identical on Euronext Expand, while it is required at least three years of 
financial history on the main list on the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
2.2.3 Information document 
Prior to listing on Euronext Growth, companies need to submit an information document, or a 
presentation document, describing the company. The information document is similar to an EEA5 
compliant prospectus, required by companies listing on Euronext Expand and the Oslo Stock 
Exchange. However, there are less regulations on how the information documentation shall be 
presented and what the document must contain, compared to an EEA compliant prospectus. The 
information document must contain certain liability disclaimers, as well as a description of the 
issuers’ business, among many other requirements. The information document is controlled by the 
issuer’s investment bank in charge of the listing. The investment bank advising the issuer needs to 
be authorized by Euronext as a Euronext Growth Advisor. 
2.3 Admission to trading and listing process 
Companies that fulfill the requirements for listing on Euronext Growth may apply for admission to 
trading. There are three main ways of admission to the Euronext Growth marketplace. The first 
option is through an IPO and a subsequent listing. A second option is to go through a private 
placement, before listing on the marketplace. The final way of admission to trading is to do a direct 
listing, where there is no prior public offering or private placement prior to listing. The foremost 
effect of a direct listing is the elimination of the investment banks’ role as underwriter.  
 
5 European Economic Area. 
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There have been one IPO, 17 direct listings and 79 private placements ahead of listing on Euronext 
Growth from 2016 until March 1, 2021.6 We are interested in the subset of private placements for 
this thesis. 
The listing process on Euronext Growth is meant to be swift, with few hurdles. Before initiating 
the process of admission to trading on the marketplace, the issuer needs to fill in a standard 
application form, as well as a draft for a presentation document in consultation with the underwriter. 
The application form must be received by Euronext at least ten trading days before the first day of 
admission to trading. There also exists a fast-track option for companies that are already listed on 
a recognized exchange. 
The typical listing process on Euronext Growth lasts ten business days (Fagervik & Ausland, 2021). 
This corresponds to our observed duration between publication of application to listing, and when 
the company starts trading. The normal duration for a listing process on the Oslo Stock Exchange 
and Euronext Expand is eight weeks in comparison. 
The exact listing process depends on which type of admission the issuer undertakes. For private 
placements, according to rules set by Euronext, the placement must have been made during the 
year prior to the scheduled date of first admission. At least three entities, not counting key insiders, 
must take part in the private placement, unless granted an exemption. The private placement can 
be conducted either through the issuance of new shares, or via a sale of shares from insiders or 
large shareholders with a share ownership of more than 20%. 
The most common approach taken by companies in our study is to announce a private placement 
in relation to the announcement about applying for admission to trading on Euronext Growth. 
  
 
6 Additionally, there were one merger, one conversion of bonds to shares and five temporary listings of shares. 
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3. Theoretical and empirical framework 
This section will cover relevant literature about reasons to go public, IPO pricing and the 
underpricing phenomenon. We will describe reasons for choosing a private placement instead of a 
traditional IPO. Relevant theories of short-run IPO performance will also be presented. After 
thoroughly searching through the underpricing literature, we have not come across research 
describing the performance or underpricing of initial private placements. However, we argue that 
the comprehensive literature describing IPO performance to a large extent is applicable to private 
placements ahead of listing. An initial private placement can be viewed as a simpler form of an 
IPO, and we argue that the effects and incentives at play in pricing the securities are for the most 
part identical for both types of offerings. 
3.1 Reasons for going public 
Many reasons have been identified for why companies choose to go public. The textbook story for 
going public is to provide greater liquidity for the company’s shares and better access to capital 
(Berk & DeMarzo, 2020). After going public, the company has access to capital markets with the 
possibility to raise funds through equity and bond offerings in the future. 
Early academic reasoning for the motivation for going public can be found in the cost of capital 
literature (e.g., Modigliani & Miller (1963) and Scott (1976)). From the cost of capital argument, 
the reason for going public can be explained by external additions of capital funding yielding a 
lower cost of capital for the company, thereby increasing the enterprise value. The pecking order 
of financing is another early theory which highlights the question of raising public capital. Pecking 
order suggests that the cost of financing increases with information asymmetries, hence companies 
prefer to raise capital from insiders when there is little or no information asymmetries involved 
(Meyers & Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984)). Given this viewpoint, the decision of going public is 
used as a final option of raising capital, after the possibility of raising internal equity and debt has 
already been fully utilized. 
Publicly traded companies further have the option of using publicly traded shares as a payment 
method in acquisitions. Companies looking for more flexibility to perform acquisitions, especially 
in consolidating industries, may thus want to go public (Brau, Francis, & Ninon, 2003). This was 
confirmed as a primary reason for going public in a US survey of 336 CFOs (Brau & Fawcett, 
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2006). It was in fact the single most important reason for going public, according to the CFOs’ 
answers. Moreover, Brau, & Fawcett (2006) found in their survey of CFOs, that going public was 
broadly viewed as a strategic reputation building move. This view was especially prominent among 
high-tech firms. 
Another motivation to go public is simply for insiders and entrepreneurs to “cash out” on their 
stake in the firm (Zingales, 1995). Ang & Brau (2003) find that there are strong incentives for 
doing so. They describe how insiders employ several strategies to conceal their intentions of selling 
shares to avoid sending adverse signals to potential investors, since cashing out can send a negative 
signal about the firm’s prospects to outside investors. 
An empirical study of Italian companies found that the main factor affecting the probability of an 
IPO is the market-to-book ratio at which firms in the same industry trade (Pagano, Panetta, & 
Zingales, 1998). The authors point to two simultaneous explanations: the first being higher 
investment needs in sectors with high growth opportunities, and the second being companies trying 
to time the market when comparable companies receive high market valuations. In 2020 and the 
beginning of 2021, there has been an avalanche of companies entering Euronext Growth. With a 
highly priced market, low barriers to entry, and a quick listing process on the marketplace, the 
timing explanation could be the most plausible reason for why so many companies have chosen to 
list on Euronext Growth recently. 
3.2 Private placement as an alternative to IPO 
The initial public offering (IPO) has been the traditional way of going public for many years, across 
marketplaces. However, it is the least common way of listing on Euronext Growth. Since the 
opening of the marketplace, only one company, Teco 2030, has had an IPO process in relation to 
its listing on Euronext Growth. The remaining companies have had private placements ahead of 
listing or have been directly listed without any primary or secondary issuance of shares. 
An IPO involves the public sale of shares to a large group of dispersed investors. The IPO is carried 
out with the assistance of an investment bank that acts as an underwriter for the firm and acquires 
buyers for the firm’s equity guaranteeing that all shares will be sold. There are three general types 
of price setting mechanisms for IPOs: book-building, auctions, and fixed price setting. Book-
building is the most common form of price setting, where the investment bank markets the 
10 
 
company to potential investors and sets the offer price after gauging the demand for the stock. 
Shares are then sold at a fixed price to the public. 
On Euronext Growth, a common alternative to an IPO is a private placement prior to listing, 
sometimes referred to as an initial private offering. Private placements involve a private issuance 
of shares and is a way for the firm to raise capital. Private placements are directed towards pre-
determined categories of institutional investors (e.g., insurance companies, banks, investment 
funds, pension funds), but also high-net-worth individuals. A private placement may be chosen if 
the issuer wants to avoid the complexities of a public offering. The focus of this thesis is on private 
placements conducted in relation to the listing of a company’s shares on a marketplace, as opposed 
to private placements after listing, which belong to the realm of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). 
Most research on private placements relates to SEOs. Fjesme & Norli (2011) point out that this can 
be due the fact that there is more available data on publicly listed companies. SEOs and initial 
private placements are notably different because of the context in which they are conducted. SEOs 
are a form of capital raising by a public company, while an initial private placement also raises 
capital, but most importantly it serves as a way of listing. Literature on SEOs is thus deemed less 
relevant for our thesis. 
The process of conducting an initial private placement on Euronext Growth consists of several 
steps. Firstly, the firm publishes a press release announcing its intention to list on Euronext Growth 
in addition to a private offering of new and/or existing shares.7 The firm also notifies the market if 
so-called cornerstone investors have pre-committed to purchase shares in the placement. In either 
the existing message, or a new one, the firm lays out the terms for the offering including the number 
of shares offered, the subscription price, whether a greenshoe option (GSO) is included and the 
application period8 with time of opening and close during which professional investors can submit 
bids for number of shares. A fixed price in advance of the application period is the most common 
price setting mechanism. Once the application period is over, the firm announces if the offering 
was successfully completed, the final subscription price and number of shares sold. The firm 
typically also says whether the private placement was oversubscribed (meaning there were bids for 
 
7 In some cases, the private placement has already been conducted when the company informs the public about its 
intention to list on the marketplace. 
8 Some firms call it the bookbuilding period or the subscription period. Either way, they refer to the period when 
investors can submit bids for the number of shares they want to purchase. 
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more shares than the company was planning to sell) and to what extent. We find that most of the 
private placements were oversubscribed, and phrases such as “significantly”, “substantially” or 
“multiple times oversubscribed” is commonly used. Some firms also state how many times the 
placement was oversubscribed.9 The information document laying out the firm’s history and plans 
is published in the days following the completion of the private placement.                               
To our knowledge, there is little literature evaluating the choice between a private and public 
offering for companies that aim to list on a public marketplace. However, the less stringent set of 
rules is a likely explanation for why initial private placements are more frequent than initial public 
offerings on Euronext Growth. Euronext Growth has a minimum shareholder requirement of 30 
compared to 500 at the Oslo Stock Exchange, and a minimum share spread of 15% compared to 
25% on the OSE. Companies listing on Euronext Growth can satisfy these requirements from a 
private offering, and do not have to go through the much more complicated and costly process of 
doing an IPO. It should be noted that many companies that list on Euronext Growth, view it as a 
steppingstone to list on either Euronext Expand or OSE’s main marketplace and are explicit about 
these ambitions.10 Nine companies have been transferred to either of these marketplaces since 
2016.11 
3.3 The underpricing phenomenon  
Underpricing is the phenomenon when the subscription price is given at a discount compared to 
the realized market price after the security has started trading. The most common way of measuring 
underpricing is the initial return, which measures the return from the subscription price to the 
closing price at the first day of trading. 
Underpricing can be seen as an indirect cost to the firm and other shareholders that sell their shares 
in the IPO, or initial private placement, since they are “leaving money on the table”. The amount 
lost by the issuing firm can be calculated as the difference between the first day closing price and 
the offer price, multiplied with the number of shares issued, if it is assumed that the company could 
 
9 The private placement of videoconferencing company Huddly was oversubscribed more than 15 times excluding 
cornerstone investors. 
10As an example, Aker Horizons, a holding company for renewable investments, expressed this ambition when it listed 
on Euronext Growth in January 2021. 
11 In 2017: Fjord1 and Songa Bulk. In 2018: MPC Containerships. In 2019: Okeanis Eco Tankers and Seabird 
Exploration. In 2020: Atlantic Sapphire and Bewi. 
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have obtained the first day closing price as its offer price. The cost of underpricing was estimated 
at $27 billion for companies going public in the United States in the years 1990 to 1998 (Loughran 
& Ritter, 2002). 
The occurrence of underpricing was first documented by Reilly & Hatfield (1969). The 
phenomenon has since been extensively researched, especially since the 1980s and 1990s, and it is 
perhaps the most studied in the IPO literature. Reilly & Hatfield based their study on 53 American 
stock issues in the period 1963-1966 and found a short-term (the Friday following the offering) 
average underpricing of 9.9% compared to an average market return of 0.3%. Loughran & Ritter 
(2004) have shown that underpricing varies over time. Average initial returns in the US doubled 
from 7% during 1980-1989 to around 15% during 1990-1998, and then jumped up to 65% during 
the dotcom bubble in the short period of 1999-2000 and then down to 12% in the next three years. 
In general, Ritter has found that the average initial return of offerings during “hot issue” markets 
are significantly higher than during “cold issue” periods. The former is defined as periods in which 
the average first month performance of new issues is abnormally high (Ibbotson & Jaffe, 1975). 
While underpricing varies over time, it also varies greatly between countries, as documented by 
Loughran, Ritter, & Rydqvist (1994). They put together findings from several studies conducted in 
25 different countries and find evidence of short-run underpricing in all of them, from 4.2% in 
France to 80.3% in Malaysia. These findings have since been updated by Jay Ritter, who currently 
maintains a website with data on IPOs worldwide. A selection of the most recent compilation from 
Ritter’s database is displayed in Table 2. Ritter has shown that underpricing varies greatly between 
different industries: in 2020, the average underpricing for US companies was 41.6% in general and 




Table 2: Equally weighted initial returns in different countries and time periods.12 
3.3.1 Underpricing in the Norwegian market 
The level of underpricing in Norway, seen in Table 3, covers the period 1984-2018 and is partly 
based on findings from Emilsen, Pedersen, & Sættem (1997). The authors studied the Norwegian 
market in the period 1984-1996 and found an average underpricing of 12.5%. In a working paper 
by Fjesme (2011), the initial return for 1993-2007 is estimated at 8%. From these findings we can 
infer that the level of underpricing has been going down over the years, which is also seen in other 
countries. Ritter (2021) has compiled data from different studies and time periods and finds the 
average underpricing in the Norwegian market to be 6.7% from 1984 to 2018, shown in Table 3. 
  
 
12 The statistics was first compiled by Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) and since been updated over time by 
Ritter (2021). Found at: https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/International.pdf  
Country Source Sample size Period
Avg. initial 
return
Argentina Eijgenhuijsen & van der Valk; Dealogic 30 1991-2018 5.70%
Australia Lee, Taylor & Walter; Woo; Pham; Dealic 2 069 1976-2018 19.80%
Austria  Aussenegg; Dealogic 106 1971-2018 6.20%
     Ushisima; Dealogic      
Canada  Jog & Riding; Jog & Srivastava; 758 1971-2017 6.40%
     Kryzanowski, Lazrak & Rakita; Ritter 
Chile  Aggarwal, Leal & Hernandez; 88 1982-2019 6.80%
     Celis & Maturana; Dealogic 
Denmark Jakobsen & Sorensen; Ritter 173 1984-2017 7.40%
Germany Ljungqvist; Rocholl;Vismara; Dealogic 840 1978-2020 21.80%
India   Marisetty and Subrahmanyam; Dealogic 3 202 1990-2020 84.00%
      Seth using Chittorgarh.com  
Italy   Arosio, Giudici & Paleari; 413 1985-2018 13.10%
     Cassia, Paleari & Redondi; Vismara; Dealogic 
Japan  Fukuda; Dawson & Hiraki; Hebner & 3 849 1970-2020 48.80%
     Hiraki; Pettway & Kaneko; Hamao, Packer, 
     & Ritter; Kaneko & Pettway; Kaneko; Dealogic 
Norway Emilsen, Pedersen & Saettem; Liden; Dealogic; Fjesme 266 1984-2018 6.70%
Sweden   Rydqvist; Schuster; de Ridder 405 1980-2015 25.90%
United Kingdom Dimson; Vismara; Levis; Doukas & Hoque 5 185 1959-2016 15.80%
United States Ibbotson, Sindelar & Ritter; Ritter 13 409 1960-2020 17.20%
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Authors Time period Average underpricing 
Emilsen, Pedersen, & Sættem (1997) 1984-1996 12.5% 
Fjesme (2011) 1993-2007 8% 
Banerjee, Dai, & Shrestha (2011) 2000-2006 4.33% 
Ritter (2021) 1984-2018 6.7% 
Table 3: Prior research on short-run IPO performance in the Norwegian market.  
It should be noted that the mean values of underpricing are almost always higher than median 
values. The reason is that a few IPOs have extreme levels of underpricing, which increases the 
mean of the sample. The Oslo Stock Exchange still exhibits a very low degree of underpricing 
relative to markets in other countries. The theory of asymmetric information influencing 
underpricing of IPOs have been argued to also hold up on a country-level (Banerjee, Dai, & 
Shrestha, 2011). Countries with higher levels of information asymmetry between company insiders 
and outsiders experience higher levels of underpricing.  
3.4 Theories of short-run IPO performance 
As there have been limited research on the short-run performance of initial private placements, the 
following section will explore theories of short-run IPO performance that are conjunctly relevant 
to explain the performance of initial private offerings.  
Ljungqvist (2007) reviews the principal theories that have been proposed to explain IPO 
underpricing and related empirical evidence. He divides theories of underpricing into four main 
categories: asymmetric information, institutional explanations, control theories, and behavioral 
explanations. There is a large body of evidence that suggests that information asymmetries have a 
first-order effect on underpricing (Ljungqvist, 2007). However, the different theories of short-run 
IPO performance are not mutually exclusive, and can thus all be part of explaining underpricing, 
and they have all been well covered in the literature. Given the large body of research in this 
domain, we will only briefly touch on the latter theories.  
3.4.1 Asymmetric information 
Models of asymmetric information have been recognized as the most established of the four broad 
explanations mentioned above. According to Ljungqvist (2007), there is substantial evidence that 
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information frictions, including conflicts of interest between the issuing company and the 
investment bank, have a primary effect on underpricing. 
The key parties in an IPO transaction are the issuing firm, the underwriter (investment bank) and 
the investors. Asymmetric information involves some of these parties having more or superior 
information compared to the others. For example, the underwriter can be better informed about the 
demand for the issue relative to the issuer itself. On the other hand, the issuer can be better informed 
about the true value of the company compared to outside investors. Lastly, outside investors can 
hold different levels of information, which can lead to the so-called winner’s curse problem. 
Winner’s curse 
Perhaps the most well-known model of asymmetric information for explaining underpricing is the 
winner’s curse theory first proposed by Rock (1986). Rock assumes that some investors are better 
informed than others about factors affecting the value of the issuing firm, and as such can avoid 
participating in overvalued IPOs. 
Rock’s model can be viewed as an application of Akerlof’s (1970) lemons problem. Rock (1986) 
distinguishes between investors who are informed about the true underlying value of the shares on 
offer, and others who are not. Informed investors only participate in IPOs that are deemed to be 
attractively priced, while uninformed investors, on the other hand, will bid indiscriminately. This 
leads to the winner’s curse for the uninformed investors: in unattractive offerings they receive all 
shares they have bid for, while in attractive offerings they receive less as shares are rationed due to 
also informed investors participating. Rock’s model assumes that none of the groups have sufficient 
demand to subscribe the entirety of the offering alone. Uninformed investors will thus demand a 
discount on the subscription price in the IPO to be willing to participate in the offering. 
Ljungqvist (2007) argues that the implication of the winner’s curse model is that uninformed 
investors will on average only receive the risk-free rate, which is just enough to keep them 
participating in the market. Furthermore, he points out that it is difficult to test empirically which 
investors are informed and which are not. A traditional and simplified view has been that 
institutional investors are more informed than retail investors. There is, however, conflicting 
evidence on whether institutional investors receive larger allocations in underpriced issues relative 
to retail investors. Aggarwal, Prabhala, & Puri (2002) find evidence of the latter in U.S. offerings. 
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There are further empirical problems with Rock’s original winner’s curse model. For example, 
underpricing is shown to be positively related to market returns prior to the IPO. This finding seems 
to suggest that IPO pricing is only partially adjusted to public information (see Logue (1973) and 
Hanley (1993)). In Rock’s original model, the informed investors are all perfectly informed about 
the value of the issue while the rest is uninformed, and the partial adjustment phenomenon cannot 
be explained. To tackle such confounds, there have been further elaborations on Rock’s (1986) 
winner’s curse model. For example, Leite (2007) generalizes the assumptions of Rock’s model and 
shows that the assumptions are consistent with the partial adjustment phenomenon. Leite (2007) 
constructs a model where investors are not either perfectly informed about the underlying value or 
uninformed, but rather hold information of variable precision. In addition to each investor’s private 
signal, Leite (2007) models a public signal that is either favorable or unfavorable and can vary in 
precision across issues. Each investor rationally forms an estimate based on both his own and the 
public signal for the allotment of shares and the aftermarket value of the issue. Leite finds that with 
such a setup, the generalized assumptions of the winner’s curse model can be consistent with 
seeming empirical confounds, such as the partial adjustment phenomenon. 
Information revelation from bookbuilding 
One of the main roles of investments banks prior to issuing shares is to elicit investor demand from 
bookbuilding. In the bookbuilding phase, the investment bank probes potential investors’ demand 
for the issue at hand, as input to set the price of the issue. In the scenario that the investment bank 
perfectly captures the willingness to pay from all investors, information asymmetries should not 
contribute to underpricing since the price is set correctly to capture the demand of both well- and 
underinformed investors. The problem for the underwriter, however, is that in the absence of 
inducements, investors have no reason to reveal their true willingness to pay (Ljungqvist, 2007). 
The well-informed investors’ incentive is rather to downplay their interest in the security with the 
aim to reduce the underwriter’s perceived investor demand, so that the issue is set at a lower price. 
Benveniste & Spindt (1989) set up an argument where the underwriters have methods to elicit more 
truthful information about investors’ demand from the bookbuilding, such that the resulting 
underpricing is reduced. Benveniste and Spindt show that the investment bank can reduce 
underpricing by selling issued shares repeatedly to the same group of investors. The underwriter 
can then use their discretion to exclude investors who tend not to reveal their true preferences in 
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the bookbuilding process, making it less attractive to downplay demand over the long term, and 
conversely reward investors who give truthful signals. By allotting more shares to investors who 
bid aggressively, the underwriter mitigates investors’ incentive to misrepresent positive 
information. The methods Benveniste and Spindt present to reduce underpricing still requires some 
degree of underpricing for the truth telling incentives to be intact, such that bookbuilding can only 
reduce underpricing from investor information asymmetries given their argument.  
Connecting and elaborating the winner’s curse and bookbuilding arguments 
Leite (2006) synthesizes Rock’s (1986) winner’s curse theory and Benveniste & Spindt’s (1989) 
bookbuilding arguments. Leite shows that in a setting with different investor information precision, 
investors’ bids fully reveal their information. He models that well-informed investors get more 
profitable allocations compared to uninformed investors, as they submit more informative bids, 
consistent with the bookbuilding argument. Moreover, Leite (2006) shows that underpricing still 
can remain as compensation to less-informed investors for participating in a disproportionally large 
share of overpriced issues, like Rock (1986) described, opposed to being a reward for well-
informed investors giving up valuable information. That is, underpricing may still occur if the 
investment bank perfectly captures the investor demand in the bookbuilding phase. 
Principal-agent theory 
Investment banks serve an important role in IPOs, handling the bookbuilding and marketing of the 
issue on behalf of the issuing firm. Loughran & Ritter (2002) highlight the potential for agency 
problems and misalignments of incentives between the underwriter and the issuer of the IPO. 
Outside investors benefit from being allocated underpriced shares and may therefore have an 
incentive to compete for such allocations by offering hidden side-payments to the underwriter 
(Loughran & Ritter, 2002). Additionally, investment bankers have an incentive to engage in 
spinning: allocating underpriced shares to executives of other companies with the aim to attract 
them as clients in the future. As underwriting fees are a function of IPO proceeds, typically in the 
form of a given percentage fee, one might think that investment banks would want to minimize 
underpricing. However, the loss of lower underwriting fees can be countered by the bank’s private 




A third group of asymmetric information models suggest that firms use underpricing to signal firm 
quality. The argument goes that if the managers possess more information about the true value of 
the firm, they can use underpricing to signal that the firm’s prospects are particularly good. It rests 
on the assumption that investors believe only the most promising firms have the luxury to do so. 
Firms issue underpriced shares “to leave a good taste in investors’ mouth”, which may allow them 
to sell equity on better terms at a later stage (Ibbotson, 1975, p. 264). 
Ljungqvist (2007) points out that firms also have other signals to choose from, such as picking 
reputable underwriters, auditors, or venture capitalists. He questions whether the issuer would 
really choose the underpricing signal given other alternatives. Signaling theory largely does not 
hold up when faced with empirical testing. Speiss & Pettway (1997) for example, find no difference 
in insider selling at the time of the IPO between more or less underpriced firms. In contrast to what 
signaling theory would predict, insiders do not seem to wait with realizing the benefit of their 
underpricing signal by delaying selling personally held shares. 
3.4.2 Institutional explanations 
Within the institutional framework, the legal liability hypothesis is perhaps the most notable. It 
suggests that underpricing is used to the reduce the likelihood of lawsuits from investors, with 
lawsuits being less likely to happen when investors see their share value appreciate. Early theories 
of investment bankers’ underpricing for making favor with investors and mitigating risks, go back 
to at least Logue (1973) and Ibbotson (1975). Tiniç (1988) argues that deliberate underpricing 
serves as a form of insurance against legal liability. Lowry & Susan (2002) found that 5.8% of the 
1,841 U.S. firms that had an IPO in the period between 1988 and 1995 were sued relating to the 
IPO. On average, settlement costs equaled 10% of proceeds raised, or 13% excluding dismissed 
cases. One should keep in mind that the legal liability hypothesis literature is strongly U.S. based, 
and it is naturally less applicable in markets with lower liability risks. 
Tax issues (see Ruud (1993)) and price stabilization measures (see Rydqvist (1997)) have also been 
proposed as alternative institutional explanations for underpricing.  
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3.4.3 Ownership and corporate control 
Going public is often associated with the separation between ownership and control since the 
managers running the firm see their equity stakes drastically reduced as outside investors are 
invited in as shareholders. The incentives of the managers may change as a result of this dilution.  
Brennan & Frank (1997) argue that underpricing, through the creation of excess demand, gives 
managers an opportunity to ration investors by reducing the block size of new shareholdings. Large 
stakes imply higher levels of external monitoring. Managers who want to retain private benefits of 
control will therefore prefer many small stakes that involve less monitoring. Brennan and Frank 
(1997) find that in the seven years following an IPO, managers sell very few shares, while other 
insiders are virtually eliminated. This is taken as evidence that managers are able to retain control 
and avoid external monitoring. Stoughton & Zechner (1997) take a completely different approach 
and suggest that underpricing may be used to minimize agency costs by encouraging monitoring. 
To the extent that managers own stakes in the firm, they themselves bear the costs of non-profit-
maximizing behavior. It can be argued that managers who own large bulks of shares should 
therefore seek to reduce these costs. Managers can use underpricing to allocate a large stake to an 
investor to encourage better monitoring.  
3.4.4 Behavioral explanations 
Behavioral theories aim to describe underpricing as the result of the presence of either irrational 
investors, or issuers suffering from behavioral biases, leading them to not put sufficient pressure 
on underwriters to reduce underpricing (Ljungqvist, 2007).  
Behavioral biases have become a popular explanation for different asset-pricing phenomena which 
are hard to reconcile with rational decision making. Ritter & Welch (2002) propose that 
overenthusiasm among retail investors may explain the high first day returns often observed among 
IPOs and subsequent weak long-run returns. However, as Cornelli et al. (2006) point out, the 
difficulty of identifying the demand curves of different investor groups makes it hard to test this 
theory. They study European IPOs completed in 1995-2002, and by using prices from the grey 
market (pre-IPO market) as proxy for small investors’ valuations, they find that high grey market 
prices, which indicates overoptimism, serve as a strong predictor of initial day prices. Conversely, 
low grey market prices, which indicates excessive pessimism, are not. Cornelli et al. conclude that 
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small investors are irrational in that they overweight their information causing IPOs to trade 40.5% 
higher, on average, than in the absence of sentiment demand. It is further argued that even in 
countries where such grey markets do not exist, overoptimism among sentiment investors will 
generate short-run price patterns. Ljungqvist, Nanda, & Singh (2006) argue that underpricing may 
be due to “exuberant investors” leading to long-run underperformance. Ofek & Richardson (2003) 
show that during the internet bubble in the US, high initial returns occurred when institutions sold 
IPO shares to over optimistic retail investors on the first day of trading in the presence of short-
sale restrictions. 
Another notable behavioral theory is related to information cascades, which occur when people 
make the same decision sequentially. Welch (1992) showed that information cascades can develop 
in IPO settings if shares are sold sequentially in the offering process. In Welch’s model, the value 
of the issued security is uncertain for any individual investor holding private information. However, 
when aggregated, the individual investors hold perfect information. If this assumption holds water, 
the buying decision of other investors will affect the buying decision of any investor. High initial 
sales indicate that the other investors have favorable information on the issued share, while low 
initial demand conversely indicate that other investors have negative information on the issued 
share. Welch thus argues that given the initial performance of an offering, the sale will either 
remain low because of low initial interest or accelerate if investors are affected by strong initial 
demand. In such a scenario, where the initial performance of an offering is critical for the following 
performance, underpricing can be a rational strategy to secure a good initial performance. If the 
issued shares are not priced at a discount, the issuer runs the risk of having a low initial interest. 
Another behavioral theory is prospect theory, which point to behavioral biases on the part of the 
issuers. Loughran & Ritter (2002) utilize Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory and argue 
that issuing firms’ perceived loss of leaving money on table is not that great, since the loss is netted 
against the much greater value gain of the retained shares’ market price jump in the case of an 
underpriced issue.  
3.5 Factors influencing short-run IPO performance 
Several characteristics both on the firm and deal level have been shown to be related to 
underpricing. This section will cover the characteristics that are most relevant to our thesis, namely 
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the classification of the firm as either a green company or a tech firm and the significance of 
cornerstone investments in IPO deals. Lastly, IPO market cycles will be considered.  
3.5.1 Green and tech firms 
Green and tech firms are considered to have several similarities being young, often in a growth 
phase and having uncertain future earnings. Lowry et al. (2010) write that greater pricing errors, 
which can be measured as higher volatility of initial returns, is to be expected when highly uncertain 
firms constitute a larger fraction of the sample of firms going public. This follows from asymmetric 
information theories, presented earlier. Building on the work of Rock (1986), Beatty & Ritter 
(1986) predict that companies characterized by greater ex ante uncertainty, meaning that the true 
value of the issue is uncertain, tend to be more underpriced on average and point to the winner’s 
curse problem being intensified by greater uncertainty. Other researchers also posit that 
underpricing follows from the difficulty of valuing private companies with uncertain prospects (see 
Benvinste & Spindt (1989) and Welch (1992). Lowry et al. (2010) find that when the types of firms 
going public are especially difficult to value13 both the mean and the variability of initial returns 
are relatively high. For example, tech firms are considered difficult to value because they depend 
so much on growth opportunities.  
The performance of tech stocks sparked the interest of researchers during the dotcom bubble in 
1999 and 2000 when IPO underpricing reached astronomical levels.14 Michael & Denis (2004) find 
that technology firms have greater underpricing after controlling for other determinants in their 
sample of IPOs between 1993 and 2000. Evidence of higher underpricing among tech firms is 
supported by Walker et al. (2015), who study the relationship between litigation risk and 
underpricing for IPOs filed in the US between 1996 and 2008. Similar to Lowry et al., they find 
that tech firms have significantly higher underpricing than non-tech firms and attribute this to 
greater ex ante uncertainty.  
We suggest that that the difficulty associated with valuing tech stock can also be extended to so-
called green companies, since both groups typically consist of young companies depending on 
 
13 For example because the firms are young, small, or tech-oriented. 
14 See the discussion in section 3.5.3 IPO Market Cycles. 
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future growth options.15 There is relatively little research on the IPO performance of green 
companies, given their relative recent emergence. Anderloni & Tanda (2017) are the first to analyze 
underpricing and stock performance of green energy companies, characterized as companies that 
produce and distribute alternative energy, using a sample of energy IPOs in the European market 
between 2000 and 2014. They find that green companies have significantly lower underpricing 
than non-green companies. However, when controlling for other firm and market specific factors, 
the difference disappears, and the green dummy does not take on a significant value. According to 
Anderloni & Tanda, their results show that the market is apparently not able to differentiate 
between green and non-green companies. 
3.5.2 Cornerstone investors 
In recent years, a new phenomenon known as cornerstone investors has become prevalent in 
European IPO markets. McNaughton & Cole (2015) define a cornerstone investment as an 
agreement between the investor, usually a large institutional or sovereign investor, and the issuer 
that the investor will subscribe for a fixed monetary amount of shares in the IPO. The investment 
typically comes with a lock-up period preventing the investor from selling its shares in a given 
period after the IPO. From the investor’s perspective, a cornerstone investment guarantees a certain 
share allocation in the issue, while for the issuer it increases the chance of the IPO being fully 
subscribed, as it reduces the number of shares to be sold in the bookbuilding process. McNaughton 
& Cole (2015) argue that the presence of cornerstone investors can help drive market momentum 
for the issue by providing a level of endorsement for the IPO. McGuinness (2012) studies the IPO 
market in Hong Kong and finds that issues with cornerstone agreements have significantly higher 
underpricing than issues without such agreements. This finding provides evidence that cornerstone 
agreements stir up subscription interest, but the possibility exists that “underpricing itself draws-in 
cornerstone investment”, according to McGuinness (2012, p. 1542). Furthermore, recent master 
theses16  have found cornerstone backed IPOs in Scandinavia to have higher levels of underpricing 
than IPOs without cornerstone involvement. 
 
15 Later in this thesis, we define green companies as those whose main described activities are targeted towards directly 
reducing pollution, greenhouse gases, creating or facilitating renewable energy production. 
16 Grepp & Sørensen (2017) and Engman & Pehrson (2017). 
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3.5.3 IPO Market Cycles 
The IPO literature has found that cycles exist both in the volume and the average initial returns of 
IPOs. The notion of “hot issue” markets has been a topic in finance since the 1960s and was first 
academically studied17 by Ibbotson & Jaffe (1975). A hot issue market refers to periods with 
unusually high underpricing. Ritter (1984) in his study of the 1980 hot issue market in the US, 
hypothesizes that these market period returns can be explained by changing risk compositions, 
meaning that hot issue periods are characterized by riskier issues resulting in higher underpricing. 
However, Ritter (1984) finds that changing risk composition alone cannot explain the unusually 
high average returns in 1980. He instead argues that the effect can be attributed to a single industry 
for that particular year: oil and gas stocks. Lowry et al. (2010) find that hot markets are also 
characterized by large volatility of returns, and that there is a strong positive correlation between 
the mean and volatility of initial returns over time. 
Ibbotson & Ritter (1995) propose ‘positive feedback’ strategies as another possible explanation for 
hot issue markets, in which investors assume positive autocorrelation in the first-day returns of 
IPOs. Investors can be willing to bid up the price of a new issue if other recent issues have risen in 
price. If enough investors follow this strategy, the result may be the positive autocorrelation of 
initial returns they assumed. Additionally, the difficulty of taking a short position in a new issue 
immediately after the offering, when few shares are available for short sale, may prevent other 
investors from making money at the expense of positive feedback traders (Ibbotson & Ritter, 1995) 
Among the most well-known hot issue markets in recent history is the dotcom bubble of 1999 and 
2000. In a sample of 2,178 US IPOs completed from 1996 to 2000, Ljungqvist & Wilhelm (2003) 
find initial day average returns to have been 73% in 1999, and 58% in 2000 for all companies. 
Internet IPOs had an average initial return of 89% in 1999 and 2000. Ljungqvist & Wilhelm (2003) 
find that the most important underpricing drivers were firm characteristics during this period. More 
specifically, they found that pre-IPO ownership structure and insider selling behavior changed 
during the dotcom period, which reduced incentives to control underpricing for decision makers. 
Unlu et al. (2004) take the study of the dotcom bubble to the UK and find higher levels of 
underpricing for technology IPOs relative to others, but the differences are not statistically 
 
17 Hot issue markets were covered extensively in the financial press from the 1960s. The U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (1963) made the first well-known investigation of the hot issue phenomenon in the Report on the Special 
Study of Security Markets. 
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significant. This suggests that the magnitude and the effect of the dotcom bubble was larger in the 
US than elsewhere.  
Helwege & Liang (2004) define hot and cold markets based on the total number of IPOs completed 
per month in their study of non-financial firms going public in the US between 1975 and 2000. 
They find that periods of high IPO volume include more firms from the same industries that also 
appear in cold markets, pointing out that the share of internet-related IPOs during the 1990s was 
about the same for hot and cold markets. The authors also consider hot and cold IPOs as defined 
by initial returns, and find that high underpricing IPOs are younger, raise more funds, and invest 
more. It is suggested that the presence of hot markets reflect greater investor optimism and is not 
driven by changes in adverse selection costs, managerial opportunism, or technological innovation. 
Loughran et al. (1994) show that the volume of IPOs in the U.S. and other countries tend to be high 
following periods of high stock markets returns. This general finding is complemented by Lowry 
& Schwert (2002), who find a significant positive relation between initial returns and future IPO 
volume. More companies go public after observing IPOs being underpriced by the greatest amount, 





3.6 Hypotheses of underpricing on Euronext Growth 
Given the theoretical and empirical framework presented above, we have established four 
hypotheses we want to explore with regards to underpricing of initial private placements on 
Euronext Growth.  
Hypothesis 1: Private placements post covid outbreak are associated with higher levels of 
underpricing than private placements before the covid outbreak. 
The covid-19 outbreak in March 2020 marked a transition from a cold to a hot market for listings 
on Euronext Growth. Stock markets in general have exhibited strong sentiment since stocks 
rebounded after the initial slump in mid-March, and there have been a record number of listings on 
the Euronext Growth marketplace from June 2020 and onwards. According to the definition of hot 
and cold markets presented above, we define the post covid outbreak period as a hot market and 
the pre covid period as a cold market. In line with the literature, we hypothesize that the hot market 
will have a higher level of underpricing than the preceding cold market. 
Hypothesis 2: Private placements of green companies are positively related to underpricing 
2020 and the beginning of 2021 has seen a wave of new companies listed on Euronext Growth that 
present themselves as environmentally friendly and sustainable companies. This is sometimes 
called the “green wave” or the “green shift” in the media. These companies are typically young, 
with a limited track record and depend largely on growth options. Contrary to the limited literature 
on green energy companies, we expect there to be higher underpricing due to greater ex-ante 
uncertainty of such firms, making it more difficult for underwriters to value them. Furthermore, we 
also expect higher underpricing as a result of strong investor sentiment for the green sector the last 
years.  
Hypothesis 3: Private placements of tech companies are positively related to underpricing 
In addition to the green wave on Euronext Growth, several technology companies have been listed 
on the marketplace. We hypothesize that tech companies will have more underpricing for the same 
reason as green companies, due to greater ex ante uncertainty and investor sentiment. In 2020, 
technology stocks saw a large surge in value evidenced by the technology heavy Nasdaq Composite 
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Index, which registered its largest gain since 2009 with an increase of 43.6%.18 We suspect that 
this strong investor sentiment also was present for Norwegian technology offers. 
Hypothesis 4: Initial private placements including cornerstone investors are positively related to 
underpricing 
Many of the recent initial private placements on Euronext Growth have included cornerstone 
investors. Based on the theoretical review of cornerstone agreements, we hypothesize that the 
presence of cornerstone investors in initial private placements is associated with higher 
underpricing. 
3.7 Long-run IPO performance 
Since we are studying the performance of initial private placements on Euronext Growth, where 
most companies have only been recently listed, we are only able to look into the short- to medium-
term performance for most of the companies in our dataset. Studying long-term performance (>1 
year) is thus not of primary interest for this thesis. Over a long-term period, IPOs have been found 
to underperform comparable firms. Ritter (1991) studied 1,526 US IPOs in the period 1975-1984 
and found that issuing firms consistently underperformed matching firms by size and industry three 
years after going public. There has also been subsequent literature on the matter of long-term 
performance, however, the proper interpretation of the poor long-run return of shares following an 
IPO remains unclear (Eckbo, Masulis, & Norli, 2007). Thus, we do not consider it to be a 









So far, we have presented background and details about the Euronext Growth marketplace, the 
process and requirements related to listing, in addition to a theoretical and empirical framework on 
private placements and underpricing of IPOs. We have also presented our hypotheses for the thesis. 
We will now proceed with presenting and describing the data that will be used for analyzing 
underpricing on Euronext Growth. 
4.1 Choice of the Euronext Growth Oslo marketplace 
The year 2020 and the beginning of 2021 has been a remarkable active period on the Euronext 
Growth Oslo marketplace. During a short timeframe there has been many private placements with 
subsequent listings. This makes it possible to study the price performance of private placements 
and listings for many companies in a similar market condition. The avalanche of listings on 
Euronext Growth in 2020 has gotten much public and media attention, describing how new growth 
companies get access to abundant supplies of capital. To our knowledge there has been no study 
of the short-term performance prior to listing of new issues on the marketplace. With the 
uniqueness of the number of private placements, the novelty of the dataset, and the relevancy of 
the topic, we find it very interesting to study the price performance of recent private placements 
and listings on Euronext Growth. 
4.1.1 Data collection 
The collected data is all gathered from publicly available sources. Data for listing time and industry 
classification is gathered from Euronext’s webpage. To find other company specific information 
for each private placement prior to listing, we have used the prospectus or information document 
of each company in our sample. We have also collected information from mandatory stock 
exchange announcements relating to the private placements on the Oslo Børs’ Newsweb webpage 
and other press releases from the companies. 
For price data, we have gathered information from Euronext Live Markets, Bloomberg and Infront. 
The subscription prices have been converted to NOK by using exchange rates for the relevant date 
gathered from the Central Bank of Norway’s (Norges Bank) webpage if given in a different 
currency. We encountered a minor data conversion problem as some companies have had share 
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splits since the listing date, thus the share price is not comparable to the offer price of the private 
placement. To adjust for the effects of share splits, we have calculated an adjusted offer price that 
is comparable to the available price data following the share split when needed. 
4.1.2 Determining the private placement sample 
To determine our private placement sample, we first obtained a list of all listing changes on 
Euronext Growth from 2016 to the last update, which was November 6, 2020.19 We expanded this 
list to include all listings until March 1, 2021.20 The list of new issues was matched with press 
releases and information documents from the Newsweb database to narrow the sample down to 
only private placements in conjunction with listing and no other types of listings. We thus excluded 
any initial public offering and direct listings where no new shares were issued, as well as issues 
that involved temporary listings of shares of companies that were already listed on Euronext 
Growth or other marketplaces. An overview of all types of listings on Euronext Growth since the 
opening of the marketplace until March 1, 2021 is shown in Table 4. 
All listings on Euronext Growth from 2016 to March 1st 2021  
Type of listing Entries 
Initial private placements 79 
Initial public offering 1 
Conversion of bonds to shares 1 
Direct listing 17 
Merger 1 
Temporary listing of shares 5 
Total number of listings 104 
Table 4: Type of listings and number of entries on Euronext Growth Oslo from 2016 until March 1, 2021. 
To be eligible to list through a private placement on Euronext Growth, the private placement must 
have been completed during the year prior to the listing, according to Euronext’s own rules. Since 
we are interested in studying the price development from the private placement issue price and the 
listing price, using Euronext’s criteria of 12 months is quite long. If the private placement occurred 
close to a year prior to the listing, the analysis of the price development from the placement to the 
 
19 The raw list of listing changes was obtained from the old Oslo Børs website: https://www.oslobors.no/Oslo-
Boers/Statistikk  
20 New listings on Euronext Growth are found at: https://live.euronext.com/en/ipo-showcase 
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listing will be severely affected by company-specific events in the interim period. Thus, for our 
sample, we will only consider private placements that were completed a maximum of six months 
prior to the day of admission to trading, similar to the approach of Fjesme & Norli (2011). For most 
companies, this is not an issue since the private placement is usually completed a few days or weeks 
prior to listing. The shortest duration between the subscription and listing in the final sample was 
one day, while the longest was 177 days, counting non-working days. The mean number of days 
between private placement21 and listing in our dataset is 18.5. The mean number is skewed by a 
few observations with a longer period between placement and listing, such that the median of 10 
days is more representative for most companies.  
Among the remaining initial private placements, we excluded a few companies before we arrived 
at our final sample, shown in Table 5. Two companies were already listed on a different stock 
exchange at the time of listing on Euronext Growth, which meant the companies were already 
priced in the market. For one company, we were not able to find the subscription price in the private 
placement ahead of listing. Two other companies were excluded due to missing price data after the 
listing. The final sample consisted of 74 private placements. 
Final sample of initial private placements  
Initial private placements 79 
Excluded: Already listed on different stock exchange (Zenith 
Energy & Envipco Holding) 2 
Excluded: No subscription price given (Lavo.tv)22  1 
Excluded: Missing price information (Brabank, TargetEveryOne) 2 
Final sample of initial private placements 74 
Table 5: Final sample of initial private placements from 2016 until March 1, 2021. 
Among the companies in the final sample, there were three companies23 that we could not find 
closing prices for at the listing day. They all had very low trading volumes in the period after listing, 
including days with zero trades. We decided to keep them in the sample, since the closing price of 
the day after listing was available. We used the close prices of the day after listing as proxies for 
 
21 The private placement date was determined using preferably the last day of the subscription period, when available, 
or the announcement of the completion of the private placement. 
22 Lavo.tv did not indicate private placement size or subscription price in its admission document dated June 18, 2018. 
23 These were Gentian Diagnostics, Sunndal Sparebank and J.P. Kenny Petroleum. 
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the initial day. Prices were relatively stable in the period after listing for these companies, thus we 
argue that using second day closing prices is not likely to skew the results notably. 
4.1.3 Sample statistics 
Table 6 shows descriptive statistics for the final sample including company age, company 
valuation, placement size, and time between the placement and the listing. 
 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics on the final sample. 
The company age is measured as the time between incorporation and listing, measured in years 
with one decimal. We used a measure for valuation at listing where the subscription price was 
multiplied with the total number of shares following the placement, similar to market capitalization. 
The private placement size is the number of issued shares in the private placement multiplied by 
the subscription price. The duration between the placement and listing is measured as the number 
of days between the subscription date and the date for the listing. The subscription date was 
measured as either the end of the subscription period, when available, or the announcement of the 
completion of the private placement. 
Descriptive statistics on the sample
Mean Median Std dev Min Max
Full period (74 obs.)
Company age at listing (years) 15.69 4.98 36.90 0.08 176.26
Valuation at listing (NOK million)* 1,770 931 2,952 38 19,911
Size of private placement (NOK million)** 486 295 673 3 4,160
Duration between placement and listing (days) 18.5 9.5 29.2 1.0 177.0
Post covid outbreak (56 obs.)
Company age at listing (years) 6.50 4.98 6.87 0.08 31.50
Valuation at listing (NOK million)* 2,091 1,097 3,296 206 19,911
Size of private placement (NOK million)** 581 425 737 6 4,160
Duration between placement and listing (days) 11.8 8.0 17.6 1.0 134.0
Pre covid outbreak (18 obs.)
Company age at listing (years) 44.28 6.38 67.47 0.26 176.26
Valuation at listing (NOK million)* 773 332 935 38 3,040
Size of private placement (NOK million)** 191 88 253 3 833
Duration between placement and listing (days) 39.2 21.5 45.3 3.0 177.0
Notes:
*Calculated as subscription price multiplied by total number of shares at listing




Euronext Growth grew slowly in the first years after its opening in 2016 under the name of Merkur 
Market, before expanding rapidly in 2020. Figure 1 shows this growth, by presenting the number 
of initial private placements in each year, including 2021 until March 1. There were 42 private 
offerings in 2020 in our sample, with most of them occurring in the second half of the year. The 
beginning of 2021 has also been a remarkably active period on Euronext Growth, with 14 private 
placements followed by listings until March 1. Previous research has found IPO volumes to be 
positively related to both companies’ demand for capital and the level of investor sentiment 
(Lowry, 2003), which indicates that the volume of offerings is affected by the general economic 
sentiment. According to Ritter & Welch (2002), the evidence shows that firms go public in 
response to favorable market conditions. This can help explain the large increase in volume during 
the latter part of 2020 and the beginning of 2021, as the stock market bounced back after the initial 
crash caused by the coronavirus pandemic in February-March, with interest rates at historic low 
levels making equity investments, and growth companies in particular, relatively more favorable. 
 





The International Benchmark Classification (ICB) is used as the industry taxonomy to assign all 
the initial private placements in the sample into different industries and sub-sectors. The ICB is an 
industry classification taxonomy launched by Dow Jones and FTSE in 2015. For companies that 
are no longer listed on Euronext Growth, either their current classification on a different 
marketplace was used, or we used our best judgement to classify the company based on its core 
activities and how comparable companies are classified. The industry classification is mostly used 
for descriptive purposes. 
Among the companies that have conducted a private placement in relation to listing, some 
industries stand out. Table 7 shows industry statistics on the private placement sample. The share 
of the total private placement volume is dominated by three almost evenly large industries: 
consumer staples (22.3%), industrials (20.7%) and energy (20.6%).  
 
Table 7: Industry overview of our sample of private placements on Euronext Growth. 
The difference between the industry share by volume and number of placements, indicates that the 
energy and consumer staple industries tend to have relatively large placements, since these industry 
shares are smaller when measured in number of placements, versus volume. The financial industry 
deviates particularly when measured by issue size and number of placements, from 10.8% when 
measured by number of placements, to 1.7% when measured by volume. This is primarily because 
many of the savings banks listed were small compared to other companies in the sample.  




Volume          
(NOK Million) Share of volume
Basic Materials 1 1.4%  925 2.6%
Consumer Dicretionary 8 10.8% 3,608 10.0%
Consumer Staples 13 17.6% 8,034 22.3%
Energy 10 13.5% 7,407 20.6%
Financials 8 10.8%  612 1.7%
Health Care 5 6.8% 1,531 4.3%
Industrials 12 16.2% 7,454 20.7%
Technology 7 9.5% 3,731 10.4%
Telecommunications 3 4.1%  907 2.5%
Utilities 7 9.5% 1,742 4.8%




As Euronext Growth is a marketplace directed towards growth companies, the typical age at the 
time of listing is relatively low. The average age is 15.7 years, while the median age is about 5 
years.24 The average age falls to 6.1 years in the hot market period in 2020 with a median age at 
4.8 years. This development is similar to Loughran & Ritter’s (2004) finding that more young firms 
went public in the years preceding the internet bubble when the median age was 5 years. Figure 2 
shows the age distribution of the sample. A sizeable proportion (16 out of 74) of the firms in the 
sample were less than 1 year old at the time of listing. 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of company age at the time of listing. 
  
 
24 Savings banks that issue equity certificates have been included in this calculation. All of them are more than 100 
years. This can to a large extent explain the difference between average and median age. 
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4.2 Potential biases 
Before moving on the with the methodology and analysis part, certain potential biases can be 
pointed out in the gathered data on initial private placements on Euronext Growth. 
4.2.1 Errors in data 
Most of the data, for example the price data, is extracted manually. Despite typing in the data with 
much care, and cross checking the values, there might still be typing errors. Additionally, another 
possible error source is failing to correct for all share splits. If any share splits have been missed, 
the apparent underpricing will be inaccurate, as the prices given in the databases will not be 
comparable to the subscription prices from the information documents. However, we have been 
cautious to search for share splits for all companies and correct the subscription price when 
discovered. 
4.2.2 Source inconsistencies 
For the price data on newly listed companies, prices from the Euronext Live Markets website were 
used. The website only provides prices for the last two years, consequently both Bloomberg and 
Infront was used to extract older price data, since neither platform gave a complete overview of all 
prices. The prices have identical formatting across all platforms; hence it is unlikely that the use of 
the different sources caused any problems in the price data. For the subscription prices and the 
number of issued shares, data was taken from Newsweb and the respective information documents 
from the companies attached to messages on Newsweb. Although the risk of source inconsistencies 





The subsequent section will describe how the initial and 30-day abnormal returns are calculated. 
Furthermore, it will present the independent variables and introduce the econometric strategy with 
regression models and econometric concerns. 
5.1 Calculation of abnormal returns 
5.1.1 Initial abnormal return 
The existing literature differs when it comes to how underpricing is measured. Recall that 
underpricing has been defined as when the closing price after the first day of trading is higher than 
the issue price of the private placement. The difference is known as the initial return of the stock, 
and underpricing indicates a positive initial return.  
McGuinness (1992), Ritter & Welch (2002), as well as Loughran and Ritter (2004), argue that 
stocks issues are efficiently priced after the first day of trading, and that initial returns therefore is 
an accurate measure of underpricing. Lowry, Officer, & Schwert (2010), on the other hand, rely on 
first-month initial returns to circumvent the potential effects of post-offer price support by 
underwriters. For this thesis, both first day and 30-day initial returns will be used as measures of 
underpricing. 
A second question is whether to adjust stock returns for interim market movements. Beatty & Ritter 
(1986) find the daily average market return to be less than 0.1% in their research period (1977-
1982) and conclude that adjusting for market movements in calculations of initial abnormal returns 
would only result in minor changes. Other researchers choose to adjust for market returns by 
subtracting the market return for the same period using a representative index.25 In the absence of 
an index consisting of shares listed on Euronext Growth, the Oslo Stock Exchange All-share Index 
(OSEAX) is preferred. It is a broad index that includes all listed shares on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange.26 Initial returns are adjusted for market movements from the time the subscription price 
is set and presented to investors, until the day of listing.27 
 
25 Logue (1973) were among the first scholars to adopt this approach. 
26 Not including shares listed on Euronext Growth or Euronext Expand. 




Initial abnormal returns will be calculated as:  






)  (1) 
Here, the subscript 0 denotes the time of subscription of the private placement, while subscript 1 
denotes the listing day. The first day abnormal return, or initial abnormal return (IAR), will be 
primarily used for descriptive purposes since it is easy to interpret directly. 
For the regression analysis, abnormal returns are natural log-transformed to reduce the effect of 
outliers on the results. Since the dataset contains companies with negative abnormal returns, 1 is 
added to the abnormal returns to calculate the logged variable: 
𝑙𝑛 (𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 1)         (2) 
(𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 1) can be thought of as the underpricing factor, as the subscription 
price multiplied by this factor is equal to the close price, adjusted for market movements. When 
describing the regression results, we will refer to (𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 1) as the initial 
underpricing factor. 
5.1.2 30-day return 
For the 30-day returns, the exact same method used to calculate initial returns is applied. 
30-day returns will be calculated as: 






)  (1) 
Here, the subscript 0 denotes the time of subscription of the private placement, while subscript 30 
denotes the close price 30 days after listing day. If the 30th day after listing was not a trading day, 
or if there were no trading the relevant day, the last available close price is used. 
We will use a natural logged variable for the regression analysis: 
𝑙𝑛 (𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛30 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 + 1)         (2) 
Where (𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛30 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 + 1) will be referred to as the 30-day underpricing factor, 
similar to the initial underpricing factor. 
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5.2 Independent variables relevant for the hypotheses 
The independent variables follow from the hypotheses as the ones we want to investigate. We are 
interested in whether certain variables are related to the level of underpricing. 
5.2.1 Post covid outbreak dummy 
Since the beginning of Euronext Growth, the stock market has been through periods of variable 
investor sentiment and market conditions. The sample is separated into two distinct periods: before 
and after March 2020, named pre covid outbreak and post covid outbreak, respectively. To test for 
differences between the periods, we construct a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the listing 
happened after the covid outbreak, and 0 otherwise. 
The pre covid period is characterized by a relatively stable stock market, following the years after 
the oil crisis. However, the first period also includes the more volatile market period in the fall of 
2018 until the covid outbreak. Only two companies were listed in this more volatile market 
situation, in 2019, at the end of the first period. No companies were listed in the volatile market of 
January-March 2020. Most of the companies in the dataset were listed in the hot issue period when 
markets started to rebound after the collapse in mid to late March 2020.  
We characterize the pre covid outbreak period as a cold market, with a small listing volume (18), 
and the post covid period as a hot market, with a high listing volume (56). 
5.2.2 Green dummy 
The media has given much attention to the fact that the Euronext Growth marketplace has attracted 
many renewable and clean-energy companies, often viewed as so-called “green” companies. 
Because of the relevancy of the marketplace for these green, or environmentally friendly 
companies, we are interested in studying the effect of being a green company on underpricing. A 
major problem for studying the effect of being green on listing performance, is that the label is not 
well defined. At the time of writing there is no consistent and agreed upon classification system for 
labeling companies that are environmentally friendly or “green”.28   
 
28 The EU is currently in the implementation phase of a taxonomy for environmental activities and reporting 
requirements for the EEA. This system is not fully implemented and ready to be used in the spring of 2021. 
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To capture the potential pricing effects of being a green company, we have created our own 
classification for green companies, described in Appendix 1: Classification of green and tech 
companies. The classification is applied using a dummy variable, similar to how dummies have 
been used for tech companies in previous research (see (Lowry & Schwert, 2002) and (Loughran 
& Ritter, 2004)). 
Since there is no agreed upon method of categorizing companies as green, we have intentionally 
tried to keep the classification as simple and transparent as possible. The classification uses the 
main activities of the firm as stated in the information document as the basis for deciding whether 
a company is green or not. Companies whose main described activities are targeted towards directly 
reducing pollution, greenhouse gases, creating or facilitating renewable energy production have 
been categorized as green. Companies that have main activities in other areas have been excluded, 
even if these activities are conducted in an environmentally friendly way. For example, it could be 
argued that the company Okeanis Eco Tankers should be labelled as green, since the company 
prioritizes vessels with low carbon footprint for its shipping activities. We have, however, chosen 
to only label companies with main activities solving environmental problems as green, with the 
intention to avoid grey areas and not to make the classification overly complex. Even though this 
approach might exclude some companies that arguably could be labelled green, we believe that our 
method will capture the price effect of green companies well, since the companies labelled green 
are clear cut cases in our opinion. The variable is constructed as a dummy and is equal to 1 if the 
company is classified as green, and 0 otherwise. Table 16 in Appendix 1 provides an overview of 
the classification of each company in the dataset. 
5.2.3 Technology dummy 
As previously described, we also want to investigate the effect of being a technology company on 
the level of underpricing. A dummy variable for companies classified as tech companies is used to 
capture this effect, similar to the approach taken by Lowery & Schwert (2002) and Loughran & 
Ritter (2004). Tech companies are identified by applying a similar method as Loughran and Ritter 
(2004), who used SIC codes to identify tech companies. Subsector ICB codes are used to identify 
tech companies. A further description of the classification, as well as an overview of all companies 
classified as tech companies is given in Table 15 and Table 16 in Appendix 1. 
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5.2.4 Cornerstone dummy 
To test the hypothesis on the effect of cornerstone investors, we have examined press releases of 
all the companies in our sample.29 It should be noted that not all press releases use the term 
‘cornerstone investors’ explicitly. Issues have been marked as having a cornerstone agreement 
whenever it is stated that certain outside investors have pre-committed to subscribe for a given 
monetary amount in the offering. We have only been able to confirm whether cornerstone 
agreements were present in the different issues, and not invalidate their presence in other issues. In 
order to keep the analysis simple, we include a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the offering 
involved a cornerstone agreement, and 0 otherwise. Other details of cornerstone agreements, such 
as cornerstones’ share of total offer size and existence and length of lock-up period, are excluded 
since this theme does not constitute the main scope of the thesis. 
5.3 Independent variables for control purposes 
The following independent variables will be used to control for company attributes that are likely 
to influence underpricing. The variables are chosen based on the theories of short-term IPO 
performance. 
5.3.1 Company size 
Company size at the time of listing is used as a proxy variable for information asymmetry and risk, 
in line with Corwin (2003). To estimate the company size, we use a variable for the company equity 
valuation, given by the subscription price. The company valuation is calculated using the 
subscription price in the private placement multiplied with the total number of outstanding shares 
after the offering. The valuation measure is similar to how market capitalization is calculated, 
although we do not call it market capitalization since the measure is calculated before listing. 
Natural logged values are used to assure linearity. 
ln 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = ln (s𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ∙ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔) 
Beatty & Ritter (1986) use offer size as a proxy of ex ante uncertainty of the firm and argue that 
smaller issues are associated with greater uncertainty and thus higher underpricing. However, due 
 
29 We were only able to find information on cornerstone investments in press releases prior to listing and not in the 
information documents the companies are obliged to publish. 
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to high multicollinearity30 between company valuation and private placement size, only the former 
measure is included as a variable. 
5.3.2 Firm age 
Firm age is a control variable to serves as a proxy for risk derived from the fact that younger 
companies have more information asymmetries and investor risk than older companies (see 
Loughran & Ritter (2004) or Ritter (1984)). Firm age is calculated as the time from the 
incorporation date to the date of admission to trading and is measured in years with two decimals. 
To assure linearity and reduce the effect of outliers, firm age values are logged. 
5.3.3 Market volatility 
Lowry, Officer, & Schwert (2010) conclude that IPO initial returns appear to be affected by 
secondary market volatility. However, they find that the effects are small compared to other known 
factors influencing underpricing. We used standard deviations of daily returns on the OSEAX index 
over the 30 trading days ending 11 days prior to listing as our measure of volatility. This is similar 
to the approach taken by Corwin (2003) in his investigation of the determinants of underpricing of 
seasoned equity offerings. 
5.3.4 OTC 
The Norwegian over-the-counter (NOTC) is an information system for unlisted shares where a 
security dealer enters buy and sell interests in the system on behalf of customers who want to buy 
or sell shares.31 Other securities dealers are notified by these entries and can thus establish contact 
and agree on a transaction if they have a customer who has entered a reciprocal order. 
We construct a dummy variable for whether the company was traded on the NOTC before 
conducting the private placement and being listed on Euronext Growth. It takes the value 1 if the 
firm was on the NOTC-list, and 0 otherwise. There is likely less asymmetric information between 
investors and companies listed on NOTC than companies that have not been listed on NOTC, since 
past price and accounting information is available for the former firms. Other things being equal, 
a general assumption is that these companies should exhibit less underpricing.  
 
30 The correlation coefficient for company valuation (logged) and private placement size (logged) is 0.796. 
31 Information about the NOTC was found at the NOTC website: https://www.notc.no/eng/About-NOTC  
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5.3.5 Greenshoe option 
A greenshoe option (GSO) is an over-allotment option, which makes it possible for the underwriter 
in an IPO or private placement transaction to sell to investors more shares than was initially planned 
by the issuer (called over-allocation), typically 15%.32 The underwriter borrows the shares from 
some investor and short-sells them in the offering. The GSO is normally exercised by the 
underwriter if the demand for the issue post-listing proves to be higher than expected and the shares 
trade above the offering price. The underwriter exercises the GSO by buying shares from the issuer 
at the offering price, returning them to the investors they were borrowed from. The offer size 
increases with the extra amount bought from the issuer. Conversely, if the price falls, the 
underwriter does not exercise the GSO but covers its short position by buying back shares at a price 
below the offer price in the market and returns them to the investors. The GSO functions as a price 
stabilization mechanism, and typically either the entire option or a part of it is exercised. In cases 
where a GSO is included in the private placement, we expect to see less underpricing.  
To examine possible GSO-effects, we create a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the private 
placement included a GSO, and 0 otherwise.  
5.4 Summary statistics for independent variables 
Table 8 shows descriptive statistics for all variables grouped by continuous variables and dummy 
variables. The values are separated into post covid outbreak, pre covid outbreak and the full period. 
 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics on independent and control variables 
 
32 The explanation of the workings of the greenshoe option was found at: 
https://www.euromoney.com/article/b1jhjnrn2psn2l/this-is-how-an-ipo-greenshoe-works  
Descriptive statistics on independent variables
Continuous variables
Mean Median Std dev Mean Median Std dev Mean Median Std dev
Company valuation (NOK mill.) 1770 931 2952 2091 1097 737 773 332 935
Firm age at listing (years) 15.7 5.0 36.9 6.5 5.0 6.9 44.3 6.4 67.5
Volatility 1.0% 0.9% 0.4% 1.0% 0.9% 0.4% 0.7% 0.7% 0.2%
Dummy variables
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency %
Post covid outbreak dummy 56 75.7% 56 100.0% 0 0.0%
Green dummy 16 21.6% 16 28.6% 0 0.0%
Tech dummy 20 27.0% 19 33.9% 1 5.6%
Cornerstone dummy 33 44.6% 33 58.9% 0 0.0%
OTC dummy 11 14.9% 6 10.7% 5 27.8%
GSO dummy 11 14.9% 11 19.6% 0 0.0%
Full period (74 obs.) Post covid outbreak (56 obs.) Pre covid outbreak (18 obs.)
Full period (74 obs.) Post covid outbreak (56 obs.) Pre covid outbreak (18 obs.)
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From the continuous variables it is evident that company valuations are larger for listings after the 
covid outbreak than before. Firms listed after the covid outbreak are on average younger than firms 
listed before. The difference is however small when comparing median values. The discrepancy 
between mean and median values can be explained by some very old companies which skew the 
average age in the sample upwards. Furthermore, all companies classified as green or tech, with 
the exception of one, were listed in the post covid period. There was only one private placement 
with cornerstone investors and greenshoe option in the pre covid period. 
Table 9 shows a correlation matrix for all independent variables described in the previous section. 
 
Table 9: Correlation matrix of all independent variables 
There are several noteworthy relationships in the correlation matrix. As expected, there is a strong 
positive correlation between company valuation (ln value) and placement size (ln placement size), 
with a correlation coefficient of 0.796. Larger firms in terms of company valuation at the time of 
subscription also have larger offers in absolute terms. Furthermore, these two variables have a 
medium strong positive correlation to both the post covid dummy and the cornerstone dummy. 
Firms listed after the covid outbreak are larger and have larger placements. Resultingly, there is 
also a medium strong correlation between the post covid dummy and the cornerstone dummy. 
Multicollinearity is further detected through the calculation of the variance inflation factor (VIF). 
The relatively high correlation between company valuation and placement size is confirmed by 
VIF values of 2.77 and 2.73 (see Table 18 in Appendix 3). 
The problem of multicollinearity is avoided by not including placement size as a variable in the 
regression. We deem company valuation to be a better proxy for company size. Lastly, firm age 
and the post covid outbreak are negatively correlated, which is to be expected given the discussion 
above. 
Correlation matrix of independent variables













Ln placement size 1.000
Ln value 0.796 1.000
Ln age -0.117 -0.145 1.000
Volatility -0.038 -0.035 0.019 1.000
Post covid dummy 0.465 0.427 -0.214 0.357 1.000
Green dummy 0.186 0.195 -0.207 0.054 0.298 1.000
Tech dummy 0.101 0.091 0.110 0.145 0.274 -0.172 1.000
Cornerstone dummy 0.545 0.498 -0.044 -0.042 0.509 0.189 0.189 1.000
OTC dummy 0.112 0.247 0.042 -0.119 -0.206 -0.035 -0.169 0.007 1.000
GSO dummy 0.373 0.336 0.089 -0.072 0.237 -0.127 0.088 0.313 0.039 1.000
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5.5 Econometric strategy 
So far in section 5 we have identified and defined the dependent and independent variables central 
to our analysis. We are interested in whether private placements conducted after the covid outbreak 
are positively related to underpricing, and whether companies classified as either green or tech are 
associated with higher levels of underpricing. Additionally, we want to investigate the effect of 
cornerstone investors. 
To test our hypotheses, we perform regressions with the independent dummy variables we have 
constructed, as well as a set of control variables. In our analysis we will use the method of linear 
regression and ordinary least squares (OLS), which minimizes the sum of squared vertical distances 
between the observed responses in the sample and the responses predicted by the linear 
approximation. 
5.5.1 Regression models 
We estimate the following regression for first day abnormal returns and include different sets of 
control variables (Table 10) to find the most solid fit. 
𝑙𝑛(𝐼𝐴𝑅 + 1) =
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑑𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ + 𝛽4𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 +  𝛽5 ln 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽6 ln 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒 +
𝛽7𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽8𝑑𝑂𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽9𝑑𝐺𝑆𝑂 + 𝑢 
We do the same for 30-day abnormal returns:  
𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝑅30−𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 1) =
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑑𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ + 𝛽4𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 +  𝛽5 ln 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽6 ln 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒 +





𝐼𝐴𝑅 Abnormal return by close price first day of listing  
𝐴𝑅30−𝑑𝑎𝑦 Abnormal return by close price 30 days after listing 
𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑 = 1 if listed after March 2020, 0 otherwise 
𝑑𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛 = 1 if classified as green, 0 otherwise 
𝑑𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ = 1 if classified as a tech company, 0 otherwise 
𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 = 1 if at least one cornerstone investor participated, 0 otherwise 
Value Company equity valuation given by subscription price 
Firm age Age of firm in years at time of listing 
Volatility Standard deviation of daily OSEAX returns in the 30-day period 
ending 11 days prior to listing 
𝑑𝑂𝑇𝐶  = 1 if traded on OTC before listing, 0 otherwise 
𝑑𝐺𝑆𝑂 = 1 if greenshoe option included in placement, 0 otherwise 
Table 10: Dependent and independent variables used in the regression models. 
5.5.2 Econometric concerns 
To justify the use of the OLS method in our regressions, the five Gauss-Markow assumptions need 
to be satisfied (Wooldridge, 2016): 
1. Linearity in the parameters 
2. Random sampling 
3. No perfect collinearity in the independent variables 
4. Exogeneity of the independent variables 
5. Homoscedasticity (constant variance in the error term) 
The first assumption is that the model in the population needs to be linear in the parameters. As 
mentioned earlier, we ln-transform all variables except the dummy variables and the volatility 
measure. The justification is to obtain as normally distributed variables as possible and to reduce 
the effect of outliers. The normality of returns is discussed in section 6.1 and 6.2. The second 
assumption is a random sample of observations. Given that we have included all initial private 
placements on Euronext Growth up until March 1, 2021 (including some with missing 
information), this should not be a problem. Thirdly, there can be no exact linear relationships 
among the independent variables. The issue of multicollinearity has been discussed above and led 
us to exclude offer size as a variable in the regression models.  
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The fourth assumption relates to exogeneity, meaning that the independent variables should not be 
correlated with the error term u. It assumes the error term u has an expected value of zero given 
any values of the independent variables. At first glance, the residual plots of both initial abnormal 
returns (Figure 12) and 30-day abnormal returns (Figure 13) appear to be normally distributed 
around zero (see Appendix 3: Residual plots). If any of the independent variables are correlated 
with some unobserved factor that also affects the dependent variable, there is an endogeneity 
problem. It can be due to omitted variable bias, functional form misspecification, measurement 
error or simultaneity (when one or more independent variables is determined jointly with the 
dependent variables). We do not judge the latter to be a problem in our dataset since all the 
independent variables can be observed prior to listing. Measurement error is discussed in section 
4.3. The functional form of the independent variables differs from the level-form only in cases 
where we want to obtain normal distributions. We have included variables deemed as relevant to 
explain abnormal returns based on the literature, but we cannot be assured that no omitted variables 
bias exists. There might be other variables that better explain the differences in returns than the 
ones we have included in our models. 
The fifth assumption is homoskedasticity, which has important implications for the efficiency of 
the model. It assumes that there is constant variance in the error term (i.e., the unobserved factors) 
for different independent variables. Heteroskedasticity occurs when the variance of the unobserved 
factors changes across different segments of the population. While heteroskedasticity does not 
result in biased estimators, the standard errors and subsequent statistical tests cannot be trusted. 
The Breusch-Pagan test is used to test for heteroscedasticity in our sample, while also running 
regressions with robust standard errors to see if this affects the significance of the variables. If the 
Gauss Markov assumptions hold, using OLS results in the best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE).  
Lastly, we include the assumption of normality in the residuals. In practice we ask whether the 
distribution of the residuals is close to being normal. This condition is discussed for both initial 
and 30-day regressions (see Appendix 3). In total, these six conditions constitute the classical linear 





The following section lays out the analysis of the thesis. Previously we have presented our 
dependent and independent variables that form our regression models. In this chapter, we will test 
our hypotheses about underpricing and identify relationships between the variables of interest and 
abnormal returns. Firstly, we will present descriptive statistics on initial abnormal returns and 30 
days abnormal returns, before discussing the regression results. Finally, we will address important 
limitations of our work and provide suggestions for future research.  
6.1 Initial abnormal returns 
Descriptive statistics on initial day underpricing for the sample have been summarized in Table 11. 
The observations are broken down into three periods: pre covid outbreak, post covid outbreak and 
the full period. 
 
Table 11: Descriptive statistics on initial day underpricing. It includes marked-adjusted initial return and the log-transformed 
variable of the market-adjusted initial return used in the regressions. All returns are equally weighted. 
The difference between simple initial return and the initial abnormal return is small with regards 
to mean, standard deviation, and other measures. This suggests that market movements from the 
time of the subscription until the day of the offering are of little significance when we analyze 
underpricing from initial returns. This is unsurprising, as the subscription date tends to be close to 
the offering dates. 
We conduct a simple one-sample t-test to test the significance of the 21.43% average underpricing 
in the overall sample and find that it is significant with a p-value less than 1%. We thus reject the 
null hypothesis of zero underpricing. 
IR IAR ln(IAR+1) IR IAR ln(IAR+1) IR IAR ln(IAR+1)
Mean 22.12% 21.43% 0.149 22.70% 22.44% 0.154 20.31% 18.31% 0.1339
Std dev 43.66% 43.98% 0.280 46.49% 46.62% 0.290 34.44% 35.50% 0.2558
Min -26.67% -22.62% -0.256 -26.67% -22.62% -0.256 -13.67% -15.79% -0.1719
25th percentile -3.16% -5.59% -0.058 -4.04% -5.23% -0.054 0.14% -5.59% -0.0576
Median 13.25% 12.75% 0.120 14.41% 13.58% 0.127 4.93% 6.24% 0.0604
75th percentile 32.59% 28.70% 0.254 33.00% 31.21% 0.272 30.38% 24.11% 0.2158
Max 231.58% 236.17% 1.212 231.58% 236.17% 1.212 121.53% 121.59% 0.7957
Kurtosis 9.825 10.449 3.507 9.918 10.693 3.924 3.524 3.510 1.603
Skewness 2.780 2.894 1.551 2.848 2.986 1.599 1.866 1.893 1.369
Descriptive statistics on inital day underpricing
Post covid outbreak (56 obs.)Full period (74 obs.) Pre covid outbreak (18 obs.)
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Adjusting for offer size, we obtain an average value-weighted abnormal return of 14.42%. A lower 
value-weighted than equally-weighted return is unsurprising given that we expect offer size to be 
negatively correlated with underpricing. Larger firms (with larger offers) typically have less 
underpricing. 
The median observation indicates that half of the placements have an initial underpricing of more 
than 12.75%. The 25th and 75th percentiles give an indication of the spread in returns. The 25% 
least underpriced placements exhibit overpricing, meaning negative first-day abnormal return of 
5.59% or more. The 25th most underpriced placements are underpriced by at least 28.70%. The 
median return is almost half the size of the mean indicating that the sample is skewed to the right. 
This is further confirmed by a skewness value of 2.894 and a kurtosis value of 10.449.33 The latter 
indicates a sharp distribution with fatter tails, also known as leptokurtic distribution. The most 
notable takeaway is the substantial mean underpricing (21.43%) and large variations within the 
sample, especially towards the higher end of the scale. The average in our sample is much larger 
than what has been found in previous time periods for the Norwegian market (see section 3.3.1). 
The highest level of underpricing in our sample is 236.17%.34 On the opposite side, the highest 
overpricing is 22.62%. 
An overview of the distribution of the dependent variables is found in Appendix 2. Figure 4 and 
Figure 5 shows histograms of the distribution of initial abnormal returns, for the different time 
periods. Even though our sample is relatively small, Figure 4 has bell-shaped distribution, skewed 
somewhat to the right especially when considering outliers. By using natural logged values of 
initial abnormal returns we obtain a more smooth distribution with less pronounced outliers. From 
Table 11 we see that the kurtosis and skewness values are substantially reduced when using natural 
log values. Figure 6 and Figure 7 in Appendix 2 displays Kernel density plots for the three periods. 
The pre-covid period has a denser distribution, while the post covid period has a fatter tail to the 
right. The latter period consists of more observations with extreme levels of underpricing. The error 
term looks to satisfy the condition of normality with an expected value of zero (see discussion 
below Figure 12 in Appendix 3). 
 
33 A normal distribution has skewness value of 0 and a kurtosis value of 3. 




There seems to be only a slight difference between average underpricing before and after the covid 
outbreak, with the latter period having marginally higher underpricing. As reference, the average 
underpricing post covid outbreak is just half the size of underpricing among US IPOs in 2020 which 
Ritter (2021) found to be 41.6%.35 The difference in underpricing before and after covid is not 
statistically significant.36 Regression (1) in Table 13 further shows that the post covid-outbreak 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero. Thus, we do not find support for our first 
hypothesis of higher underpricing for companies listed after the covid outbreak.  
6.2 30-day abnormal returns 
Since we observe a relatively high level of initial abnormal returns, it is also worth investigating 
whether underpricing persists over a longer period that can still be considered short-run 
performance. Table 12 summaries descriptive statistics on abnormal returns by using the share 
price 30 days after listing. 
 
Table 12: Descriptive statistics on 30-day returns. It includes marked-adjusted 30-day return and the log-transformed variable of 
the market-adjusted 30-day return used in the regressions. All returns are equally weighted. 
The difference between initial and abnormal returns is larger for mean, standard deviation, and 
other measures, compared to what was found for first day returns. This suggests that market 
movements have a larger effect when the time horizon is more stretched out.  
We focus on the abnormal return columns. The sample mean is 32.15%, a substantial 30-day 
abnormal return which is larger than the average initial day return previously found. The difference 
 
35 Equal-weighed first day return. 
36 Two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances gives a one-sided p-value of 0.35, indicating a non-significant 
difference. 
30d R 30d AR ln(30d AR+1) 30d R 30d AR ln(30d AR+1) 30d R 30d AR ln(30d AR+1)
Mean 36.29% 32.15% 0.185 36.79% 32.74% 0.193 34.76% 30.33% 0.1588
Std dev 70.87% 71.55% 0.397 68.02% 69.06% 0.394 81.21% 80.92% 0.4154
Min -37.15% -34.90% -0.429 -37.15% -34.90% -0.429 -13.67% -14.74% -0.1594
25th percentile -0.62% -7.79% -0.081 -0.17% -9.03% -0.095 -1.89% -7.09% -0.0736
Median 13.13% 10.41% 0.099 14.89% 11.93% 0.113 3.46% 0.95% 0.0095
75th percentile 40.78% 38.76% 0.335 47.17% 43.22% 0.359 23.87% 17.49% 0.1611
Max 315.75% 309.51% 1.410 285.03% 289.37% 1.359 315.75% 309.51% 1.4098
Kurtosis 6.275 6.447 2.067 5.819 6.288 1.765 8.956 8.758 4.480
Skewness 2.496 2.527 1.467 2.366 2.445 1.283 2.934 2.893 2.176
Descriptive statistics on 30-day underpricing
Full period (74 obs.) Post covid outbreak (56 obs.) Pre covid outbreak (18 obs.)
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in sample means is however not found to be statistically significant.37 Thus, we do not find that 30-
day underpricing is statistically larger than initial day underpricing. Adjusting for offer size, the 
average 30-day abnormal return is 19.04%, again lower than the equally-weighted average. 
The median observation indicates that half of the placements have an underpricing of more than 
10.41%. The 25th and 75th percentiles also indicate a greater upside than downside similar to what 
was found for initial day returns. 30-day returns have a larger standard deviation than initial day 
returns, but with a somewhat smaller skewness and kurtosis. The median is smaller than the mean, 
indicating a distribution skewed to the right, with the highest underpricing being 309.51%. An 
overview of the distribution of the dependent variables is provided in Appendix 2. Similar to the 
initial day return, the post covid outbreak period has a slightly larger 30-day abnormal return than 
the pre covid period. The difference is however not found to be statistically significant.38 The error 
term looks to satisfy the condition of normality with an expected value of zero (see discussion 
below Figure 13 in Appendix 3) 
Industry differences 
The industry classification reveals differences in average initial and 30-day abnormal returns 
between industries, as seen in Figure 3. When comparing the two return measures, it is evident that 
some industries exhibit larger underpricing after 30 days than after the first day, while it is the 
opposite for other industries. The energy sector especially stands out, with an average underpricing 
of respectively 57.35% and 95.40%. It should be noted that some industries consist of very few 
observations. Hence the industry differences may not be statistically significant and should be 
interpreted with care.  
 
37 Two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances gives a one-sided p-value of 0.14, indicating a non-significant 
difference. 





Figure 3: Industry differences in initial and 30-day underpricing from the sample. 
6.3 Regression results 
The following section will present and interpret the regression outputs for initial abnormal return 
and 30-day abnormal return. 
6.3.1 Initial abnormal returns 
Table 13 shows five different OLS regressions on the natural logged initial abnormal return 
variable. The first regression only includes the post covid dummy variable which is not significant. 
The first regression has close to zero explanatory power, given the low R2 value. The coefficient 
for the post covid dummy is not significant, which means that we find no evidence in the regression 















Table 13: Regressions on initial abnormal returns. 
The accompanying table presents the results of linear regressions assessing the effect of different variables on initial abnormal 
returns in initial private placements on Euronext Growth. The dependent variable (ln (IAR+1) is the logged underpricing factor. 
The four independent variables are all dummy variables: a post covid outbreak dummy, a green company dummy, a tech firm 
dummy and a cornerstone investors dummy. The control variables include logarithmic transformations of company value at time of 
listing and firm age, a market volatility measure, as well as dummy variables for OTC listing and GSO. Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses below each coefficient. All regressions are tested for heteroskedasticity using the Breusch Pagan test (see Table 19 
in Appendix 5). None of the regressions display autocorrelation in the residuals (see Table 17 in Appendix 3). 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post covid outbreak 0.02 0.084 0.082 0.079 0.063


















(0.070) (0.066) (0.067) (0.068)
Cornerstone (dummy) -0.160
** -0.060 -0.033 -0.034


































(0.066) (0.058) (0.511) (0.518) (0.573)
Observations 74 74 74 74 74
R
2 0.001 0.27 0.387 0.416 0.424
Adjusted R
2 -0.013 0.227 0.332 0.354 0.343
F Statistic

























When adding dummies for green, tech and cornerstone in regression (2), the adjusted R2 increases, 
and the model now captures about 22% of the variation in the logged abnormal returns. In 
regression (2) the green variable is significant with a p-value less than 1%. The green dummy 
coefficient has a positive sign, which means that companies categorized as green tend to have more 
underpricing, in line with our hypothesis. The tech dummy variable coefficient has a negative sign 
while being significant with a p-value less than 5%. The cornerstone variable coefficient also has 
a negative sign, and it is significant with a p-value less than 5%. The sign of the tech and 
cornerstone dummies indicate that tech companies and companies with cornerstone investors are 
associated with less underpricing, which goes against our hypotheses. Regression (2) exhibits 
heteroskedasticity from the Breusch Pagan test at a 1% significance level, thus we do not prefer 
this model (see Table 19). Using robust standard errors does not alter the significance of the 
different variables in any substantial way (see Table 20), suggesting that heteroskedasticity is not 
a major problem in the model. 
In regression (3) control variables for firm size and firm age are added. Adding these variables 
increases the adjusted R2 to 35%, which means that about 35% of the variation in the dependent 
variable is captured by the model. In regression (3), the cornerstone dummy variable is not 
significant, which could be explained by the cornerstone dummy being partially correlated with 
firm size and age, as seen from the correlation matrix in Table 9. The dummy variable for green 
companies is significant at the 1% level, with a positive sign. Regression (3) exhibits 
heteroskedasticity from the Breusch Pagan test at the 5% level, thus we reject this model. 
In regression (4) market volatility before listing is added as a control variable. We find no evidence 
of heteroscedasticity from the Breusch Pagan test at the 5% level. Regression (4) further has the 
highest adjusted R2, leading us to prefer this model thus far. The negative sign of the tech dummy 
breaks with our hypothesis that tech companies would have more underpricing. 
The green dummy variable is still significant at a 1% level in regression (4). The coefficient is a 
little more complex to interpret directly. It denotes that on average, green companies have a 
𝑒0.233 − 1 = 26.2% larger underpricing factor, i.e. (IAR+1), is increased by 26.2%. For most 
companies, this translates to an expected increase in abnormal return of more than 26.2 percentage 
points if the company is green, since the mean abnormal return is greater than zero. 
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The company value, firm age and volatility variables all have the signs we would expect. The 
negative sign of company value and firm age indicate that larger and older companies have less 
underpricing. For company value, the coefficient of -0.076 for ln value, indicates that a 1% increase 
in company value is associated with a decrease of the underpricing coefficient of 0.076%. For most 
companies, this translates to a decrease of more than 0.076 percentage points in the abnormal return 
for a 1% company value increase. Similarly, for company age, the coefficient of -0.03 for ln firm 
age, indicates that a 1% increase in company age gives a decrease of the underpricing coefficient 
of 0.03%. For most companies, this translates to a decrease of more than 0.032 percentage points 
in the abnormal return for a 1% increase in company age. The volatility variable is positively 
correlated with underpricing. This is to be expected as higher uncertainty close to the subscription 
time should give higher underpricing. The coefficient of 23.331 indicates that if the volatility39 
increases by 1 unit (meaning 100 percentage points), the underpricing factor increases by an 
extremely large factor. Note that the volatility ranges between 0.51% and 3.13% for our dataset, 
such that a more suitable interpretation is that a 1 percentage point increase in the volatility prior 
to listing increases the underpricing factor on average by about 23.3%.40 It should be noted that the 
sample is likely to be self-selected with observations that only have low volatility prior to listing, 
as companies tend to not list during periods of high market volatility (Dicle & Levendis, 2018).41 
When adding the remaining control variables in regression (5), there is no increase in explanatory 
power. The dummy variables for greenshoe option or NOTC listing are not significantly different 
from zero in regression (5). We find no evidence of heteroskedasticity in regression (5) either. 
Since the added control variables do not yield a higher R2 than regression (4), and the added control 
variables are not significant, our preferred model is regression (4). We note that the coefficient for 
the green dummy variable is not reduced when including additional control variables, suggesting 
that the underpricing premium among green companies is not related to firm age, size, market 
volatility or other characteristics. 
 
39 The volatility measure used is the standard deviation for the daily percentage OSEAX price movements in the 30-
day period ending 11 days prior to listing. 
40 The exact effect for a 1 percentage point increase is 𝑒0.2331 − 1 = 26.2% 
41 We also see such a tendency in our dataset, with no listings in the first quarter of 2020 or during the fall of 2018. 
Both of these periods had relatively high market volatility. 
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6.3.2 30-day abnormal returns 
We run similar regressions for the logged 30-day abnormal return variable, shown in Table 14. 
 
Table 14: Regressions on 30-day abnormal returns. 
The accompanying table presents the results of linear regressions assessing the effect of different variables on 30-day abnormal 
returns in initial private placements on Euronext Growth. The dependent variable (ln (30dAR+1) is the logged underpricing factor. 
The four independent variables are all dummy variables: a post covid outbreak dummy, a green company dummy, a tech firm 
dummy and a cornerstone investors dummy. The control variables include logarithmic transformations of company value at time of 
listing and firm age, a market volatility measure, as well as dummy variables for OTC listing and GSO. Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses below each coefficient. All regressions are tested for heteroskedasticity using the Breusch Pagan test (see Table 19 
in Appendix 5). None of the regressions display autocorrelation in the residuals (see Table 17 in Appendix 3). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post covid outbreak 0.034 0.035 0.026 0.022 -0.008









(0.109) (0.106) (0.100) (0.107)
Tech (dummy) -0.042 -0.021 -0.07 -0.078
(0.101) (0.099) (0.098) (0.100)
Cornerstone (dummy) -0.200 -0.092 -0.040 -0.044




























(0.094) (0.084) (0.763) (0.762) (0.844)
Observations 74 74 74 74 74
R
2 0.001 0.245 0.32 0.369 0.376
Adjusted R
2 -0.012 0.201 0.259 0.302 0.288
F Statistic
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From the 30-day abnormal return regressions, we do not find any significance for the post covid 
dummy, like for the IAR-regressions. The different 30-day regressions also exhibit similar patterns 
of heteroskedasticity as the first day regressions (1) to (3) (see Table 19). However, regression (4) 
does not exhibit heteroskedasticity at the 5% level from the Breusch Pagan test, and thus we will 
focus our attention on this one. It has an adjusted R2 of 30%, which means that the independent 
variables capture about 30% of the variation in the dependent variable. Compared to regression (4) 
from the initial regressions in Table 13, the R2 is about 5 percentage points lower. 
Test statistics from the Breusch Pagan test are available in Appendix 5 for all five regression 
models for the 30-day regression as well, in addition to regressions with robust standard errors. 
Using robust standard errors does not alter the significance of the different variables in any 
substantial way, suggesting that heteroskedasticity is not a major problem in the 30-day model 
either. 
In regression (4), we have added the green, tech and cornerstone dummies, as well as control 
variables for firm value and age, as well as the volatility variable. Again, we find a negative sign 
for the tech dummy, but for the logged 30-day returns we do not find it to be significant. Similar 
to what was found in the regressions on logged initial abnormal returns, the cornerstone dummy 
has a negative coefficient but is not significant in any of the regressions. 
The perhaps most interesting observation from the logged 30-day abnormal return regressions is 
that the green dummy coefficient has almost twice the magnitude compared to the initial abnormal 
return regressions. The green coefficient is highly significant with a p-value less than 1% for all 
regressions where the variable is included. From regression (4), the green dummy coefficient of 
0.429 denotes that on average, green companies have a 𝑒0.429 − 1 = 53.6% larger 30-day 
underpricing factor, meaning (30d AR+1) is increased by 53.6%. This translates to an increase in 
the 30-day abnormal return of more than 53.6 percentage points for most companies. This contrasts 
to the initial abnormal return regression, where we found that green companies had on average a 
26.2% larger initial underpricing factor. 
The company value variable in regression (4) has a negative sign as expected, similar to the initial 
abnormal return regression. The negative sign indicates that companies that are older have less 
underpricing. However, the coefficient for the control variable for firm age is no longer 
significantly different from zero. For company value, the coefficient of -0.081 indicates that a 1% 
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increase in company value is associated with a decrease of the underpricing coefficient of 0.081%. 
For most companies, this translates to a decrease of more than 0.081 percentage points in the 
abnormal return for a 1% company value increase. 
The volatility variable is somewhat different from the initial abnormal return regressions. It is still 
positively correlated with underpricing, but the coefficient is larger at 43.356. It is statistically 
significant with a p-value less than 5%. The coefficient of 43.356 indicates that if the volatility 
increases by 1 percentage point, then the underpricing factor increases by about 43.36%. 
Adding the OTC and GSO dummy variables does not increase the explanatory power of the model 
similar to what was found in the regressions on initial abnormal returns. 
6.4 Discussion of results 
Based on the descriptive statistics and findings from the regressions, we can further discuss the 
overall results and the implications for our hypotheses. 
Our main finding is that green companies are associated with higher levels of underpricing on 
Euronext Growth. From the descriptive statistics we find that that the green companies have an 
average initial abnormal return of 54.6%, and an average 30-day abnormal return of 86.18%. This 
could suggest that green companies experience a positive stock price momentum for some period 
after listing. The regression results confirm the strong investor sentiment among renewable and 
environmentally friendly companies that has been widely reported in the Norwegian business press. 
The associated effect of green companies on underpricing on Euronext Growth is strong. We find 
that green companies are associated with a 26.2 percentage points higher initial abnormal return, 
and a 53.6 percentage points higher 30-day abnormal return, controlling for other factors. Despite 
a limited sample size of only 16 green companies out of a total sample of 74 companies, we obtain 
highly significant results.  
Our findings can be contrasted to that of Anderloni & Tanda (2017), who studied energy IPOs 
between 2000 and 2014 on the main European markets and found that green energy companies 
have lower first day returns than non-green companies. When Anderloni & Tanda controlled for 
firm and offer characteristics, as well as the economic cycle, the difference between the two groups 
disappeared. In our sample, being a green versus non-green company is, as mentioned, on average 
associated with 26.2 percentage points more initial underpricing, and 53.6 percentage points when 
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considering 30-day abnormal returns, derived from the coefficients of the green dummy variables. 
From a one-sided t-test of the difference between the effect of the green dummy on the underpricing 
factors, we find that the effect for the 30-day underpricing factor is significantly larger.42 This 
finding suggests that the price premium on green companies on Euronext Growth takes some time 
to be fulfilled. 
The positive underpricing effect for green companies found in this thesis, breaks with some 
previous research on green energy companies (Anderloni & Tanda, 2017), that have not found 
significantly higher underpricing when controlling for other factors. However, our findings are in 
line with Ritter’s (1984) work on the 1980 hot issue market in the US. Ritter found that almost all 
the underpricing in that year could be attributed to a single industry, the oil and gas sectors. 
Additionally, the green underpricing effect can also be explained by green companies have higher 
ex-ante uncertainty, as explained below. 
We argue that there are two competing explanations for the greater underpricing among green 
companies. The first one deals with the uncertainty related to the pricing of green companies in the 
private placement, while the second separates between how primary and secondary market 
investors value issues. As mentioned in section 3.5.1 Green and tech firms issues with greater ex-
ante uncertainty (uncertainty about the true value of the issue per share) will have greater expected 
underpricing, according to Beatty & Ritter (1986). We judge the green companies in our sample to 
have greater ex-ante uncertainty than the average company in our sample, given their limited track-
record and valuations largely depending on growth options. Consequently, we should expect these 
issues to be more underpriced, which is also what we find. It also may be that the winner’s curse 
is intensified by higher ex-ante uncertainty, as Beatty & Ritter (1986) argue (underpricing 
compensates investors for the greater cost of being informed), which can perhaps explain the higher 
underpricing on Euronext Growth in general (compared to the main list on the Oslo Stock Exchange 
in other periods) and green companies in particular. It can be seen as more costly for an investor to 
become fully informed about the prospects of Euronext Growth companies, thus they demand a 
discount in the offer price to be willing to participate in the initial private placement.  
Furthermore, issues with higher ex-ante uncertainty, also have larger pricing errors since they are 
more difficult to value (see Lowry et al (2010)). The initial abnormal return of the green companies 
 
42 A one-sided independent t-test of the difference in the green coefficients gives a t-statistic greater than 13. 
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in our sample averages 54.7% and ranges from -11.4% to 198.1%, illustrating underwriters’ 
difficulty in valuing companies characterized by high ex-ante uncertainty. The standard deviation 
of the initial abnormal returns is 44% for the full sample (see Table 11) but only 26% when 
excluding the green companies, confirming the positive relation between mean and volatility of 
underpricing. 
A second plausible explanation is that the investors who participate in the initial offering of shares 
in the private placement, tend to be more modest in their valuations, compared to the secondary 
market investors that begin trading the issued shares after listing. The tendency of professional 
investors participating in the bookbuilding to have lower valuations compared to retail investors in 
the secondary market, may be due to the professional investors relying more on fundamental 
valuation techniques, compared to retail investors. It can also be the result of professional investors 
holding different quality information compared to other investors, in line with information 
asymmetry arguments, such as in Rock (1986) or Leite’s (2006) elaborated model. 
The differences in valuation between retail investors and professional investors can also be a result 
of overoptimism among retail investors. Such an explanation is in line with Ritter and Welch 
(2002). Overoptimism among retail investors who buy shares from institutional investors can drive 
up stock prices and explain the underpricing effect of green companies. It is plausible that retail 
investors get more influenced by the media attention and hype around green companies compared 
to investors participating in the bookbuilding. The placements on Euronext Growth are directed 
towards institutional and high net worth private investors, while smaller retail investors enter in the 
aftermarket after the issue has been listed. While we do not identify the demand curve of these 
investor groups, there is ample evidence that retail investors have entered the Norwegian stock 
market in large numbers after the market collapse caused by the coronavirus pandemic in March 
2020 and many of them have bought shares in Euronext Growth companies.43 
For the whole sample, we find the average underpricing measured as initial abnormal return and 
30-day abnormal return to be respectively 21.45% and 32.15%. The relatively high level of 
underpricing can be seen in light of the seemingly strong sentiment among investors on Euronext 
 
43 According to figures from the non-profit foundation AksjeNorge and Euronext VPS, the Oslo Stock Exchange has 




Growth. Initial private placements on Euronext Growth from the second half of 2020 and onwards 
have sparked significant interest from investors with most recent placements being several times 
oversubscribed. A comparison can be made to IPOs on the Oslo Stock Exchange’s main list in the 
same period, 2016-2021. The main list does not display the same hot market tendencies found on 
Euronext Growth. The underpricing among recent listings on the main list, is considerably more 
modest in comparison to Euronext Growth44, which leads us to conclude that the existence of a hot 
market is limited to the latter marketplace. The comparison sample on the main list is small. In 
2020, the most active year on Euronext Growth so far, there were only 9 new listings on the main 
list, of which only four were the result of IPOs and one was a private placement.45 The remainder 
were transfers from Euronext Growth or Euronext Expand. At the time of writing thus far in 2021, 
three companies have transferred from Euronext Growth to the main list, and several are expected 
to those so in the months to come. 
Differences in underpricing between Euronext Growth and the main list may be due to differences 
in the firm characteristics of the companies that list on the different marketplaces. Companies 
listing on Euronext Growth are typically young, in a growth phase and with limited track record. 
These factors should imply higher underpricing on Euronext Growth compared to the main list. 
Moreover, Euronext Growth is a smaller and less liquid marketplace than the main list. According 
to risk-return theory, issues with lower liquidity should be more underpriced as investors demand 
to be compensated for the liquidity risk of the shares they are buying. While we have not 
investigated the relation between liquidity and underpricing in this thesis, we observe that several 
of the most underpriced issues in our sample also had large share turnovers (a measure of liquidity) 
on the first day of trading. The three most underpriced issues in our sample – Horisont Energi 
(236%), Aker Carbon Capture (198%) and Aker Offshore Wind (133%) had turnovers on the first 
of trading of respectively 55 MNOK, 105 MNOK and 106 MNOK. Thus, we do not expect that 
including a liquidity measure would have affected our results substantially. 
Amongst our other hypotheses, we find less significant results. We do not find support for the first 
hypothesis that listings after the covid outbreak have significantly higher underpricing compared 
to listings before the pandemic. That is: we find no evidence that the hot marked period following 
 
44 The exception here is Pexip (listed 14.05.20) which had a first-day return of 38.89% and 30-day return of 42.52% 
in comparison to its IPO price. 
45 New listings on Oslo Stock Exchange’s main list are found at: https://live.euronext.com/en/ipo-showcase 
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the covid outbreak has significantly higher underpricing compared to the relatively colder market 
period before March 2020. This finding can be seen in light of the limited sample size of just 18 
listings in the pre covid period. 
We do not find evidence in favor of our third hypothesis that tech companies also have higher 
underpricing. Initial abnormal returns differ substantially for the tech companies in our sample with 
an average of 4.2%. When including control variables, we find the effect of being a tech firm to be 
significantly negative for initial returns and not significant for 30-day returns. This finding is in 
sharp contrast to the extreme levels of underpricing among tech stock IPOs in the US during the 
dotcom bubble and in 2020. Ritter (2021) finds an equally weighted average first-day return of 
63.7% for tech companies in 2020, substantially above the first day return for non-tech companies 
at 34%. Again, it should be noted that our sample size is limited to only 20 tech companies. Neither 
can we draw the conclusion that tech in itself causes negative abnormal returns, also known as 
overpricing. 
Likewise, we do not find support for the fourth hypothesis that cornerstone investments result in 
higher underpricing, for either initial or 30-day returns. This is in contrast to previous studies46 of 
initial public offerings in Scandinavia, which found that the presence of cornerstone investments 
results in higher underpricing. Cornerstone investors sending positive signals to the market about 
firm quality, resulting in increased demand for the issue on the first day of trading, was presented 
as a possible explanation for the higher underpricing. We are not able to verify this proposed 
explanation for Euronext Growth. While McNaughton & Cole (2015) write that a lock-up period 
is a typical feature for cornerstone investments in Europe, we are not able to confirm the existence 
of lock-up periods in cornerstone agreements on Euronext Growth. Lock-up periods usually last at 
least six months and prevent investors from selling their shares in this period. They thus provide 
greater stability for the issue in the aftermarket and help drive demand since fewer free float shares 
are available for purchase (McNaughton & Cole, 2015). Additionally, the market can anticipate 
when a secondary exit from the lock-up is likely to occur. The apparent absence of lock-up on 
Euronext Growth can perhaps explain our finding that cornerstone investments in initial private 
placements have a non-significant effect on underpricing. 
 
46 Master theses by Grepp and Sørensen (2017), and Engman and Pehrson (2017). 
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6.5 Medium term performance 
In addition to the regressions on initial and 30-day returns, we also looked into 90 and 180-day 
returns to investigate whether our findings also hold on a medium term. Increasing the time frame 
meant that we could not include all initial private placements since had firms had only been listed 
recently. For the 90-day returns we had 65 observations (see Table 22), while for the 180-day 
returns we had 49 observations (see Table 23). We focus our attention on the abnormal return 
column for both 90 and 180 days. The mean abnormal return for 90 days is 66.14%, while the 
median return is only 13.26%, suggesting that the large average return is driven by a few outliers. 
The standard deviation is 130.79%, which is much larger than for both initial and 30-day returns, 
indicating a wider distribution with larger outliers. Extending returns to 180 days, the mean 
abnormal return falls to 53.10% and the median falls 5.83%. The standard deviation increases 
further as some observations have very large abnormal returns, with the maximum 180-day 
abnormal return being 915.29%.47 
We have further made similar regressions on the underpricing factor of the 90 and 180-day returns 
as for the initial and 30-day returns (see Appendix 6). We find that the green dummy is still 
significant on a 1% level, with a positive sign. As we increase the time horizon to 90-day and then 
180-day returns, the green coefficient becomes larger, indicating that green companies are 
associated with a greater price increase on a 90-day and 180-day interval following listing. For 
example, the green dummy in regression (4) in Table 24 has a coefficient of  0.719, which denotes 
that on average green companies have a 𝑒0.719 − 1 = 105.2% larger 90-day underpricing factor, 
meaning (30d AR+1) is increased by 105.2%. This translates to an increase in the 90-day abnormal 
return of more than 105.2 percentage points for most companies. Similarly, for 180-day returns, 
the green dummy coefficient of regression (4) (see Table 25) of 0.884 denotes that most green 
companies should have 142% higher 180-day underpricing. 
The apparent medium term underpricing effect for green companies seem unintuitively strong. We 
are thus careful to conclude that this is a sign of underpricing. A natural explanation for the 
seemingly high effect of green companies is that green companies in general have increased in 
value over the period for our sample. Furthermore, the OSEAX, as our market adjuster, fails to 
 
47 The carbon capture company Aker Carbon Capture had a 180-day abnormal return of 915.29%. 
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correct for all the price increase on a 90 and 180-day period, since it is an index of the Norwegian 
stock market as a whole, and not the green sector. The greater magnitude of the green dummy 
coefficient on longer time horizons can thus be a result of the green industry having risen more 
than the rest of the market, opposed to being a result of underpricing. 
6.6 Limitations and further research 
Now that we have presented and discussed our findings, we also want to highlight the limitations 
of our study and provide suggestions for further research. The most important limitations are the 
small sample size and the short time frame, as well as the market adjuster used and the possibly 
biased classification of green companies. 
Euronext Growth was established relatively recently, in 2016, and the majority of listings on the 
marketplace have come in 2020 and the beginning of 2021. On the basis of number of listings, we 
decided to separate our sample into two periods, before and after the covid outbreak, with the first 
period considered a cold market and the second period a hot market. Since the first period only 
consisted of 18 observations, it is hard to draw any definitive conclusion about our first hypothesis. 
We do not find any statistical difference in abnormal returns between listings before and after the 
covid outbreak. We could have characterized each individual month, as either hot, cold, or neutral 
depending on number of listings, but chose to not do so due to the limited sample size and time 
frame. 
As mentioned in the previous section, the OSEAX index used to adjust for market returns, does not 
reflect the observations in our sample very well. Thus, we are not able to appropriately adjust for 
the price increase in different sectors when estimating abnormal returns. This has a greater effect 
on longer term returns, such as 30-day, 90-day, and 180-day. Initial returns are less affected by this 
limitation. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the sample of green companies is taken from a condensed time 
period spanning a few months. The significantly higher underpricing of green companies may not 
hold up for a larger sample size or when looking at a longer time frame. Our classification of 
companies as green was based on our best judgement of the main activities of the company. What 
the correct classification looks like is certainly up for discussion, and a different study could have 
come up with a different grouping of companies. Sequentially, the regression results on initial 
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abnormal returns would be different. Given our classification, “green” companies have statistically 
higher underpricing than non-green companies, also when controlling for relevant factors. It is 
important to emphasize that a statistically significant correlation does not prove a causal effect. It 
may be that the green companies we have classified also share some other unobserved characteristic 
that serve as the driver of higher underpricing (omitted variable bias). It should also be noted that 
the green dummy implies a binary outcome in which a company is either green or non-green, while 
in reality a company can be deemed as either more or less green on a continuing spectrum. 
However, for the purpose of our thesis we found using a dummy variable to be most appropriate. 
Further, some firms had to be excluded from our final sample due to missing information, while 
for other firms we were not able to obtain first day returns and had to use second day returns instead. 
Both limitations may have resulted in biased results. Lastly, we did not include information on 
whether the initial private placements were venture-capital-backed or the underwriter 
characteristics of each offering, including quality and quantity of underwriters. These variables 
have previously been shown to be related to the level of underpricing. 
Based on our study, we see several pathways for further research. As more companies get listed on 
Euronext Growth it would be interesting to study whether the green effect found in this thesis is 
present for a larger sample, in addition to factors found to be insignificant such as tech and 
cornerstone investments. It would also be worth studying the long-run performance (more than 1 
year) of initial private placements on Euronext Growth in the future when more issues have been 
listed for a longer period. Such a study could shed light on the relatively sparsely studied long-run 
performance of initial private placements and whether they underperform similar to IPOs in 
relation to comparable firms. More initial private placements on Euronext Growth will also make 





Previous research has documented the existence of underpricing among initial public offerings, 
i.e., when the first day closing price (or 30-day closing price) is higher than the subscription price 
in the offering prior to listing. However, there has been little research on the underpricing of the 
alternative way of going public, through an initial private offering or placement prior to listing, in 
which only certain pre-determined investors are invited to participate.  
We study underpricing among initial private placements on the rapidly growing Euronext Growth 
Oslo marketplace since its opening under the name of Merkur Market in 2016, until March 1st, 
2021. Euronext Growth differs from a traditional stock exchange due to its less strict listing 
requirements, making it a more suitable marketplace for young growth companies, many of them 
being renewable or cleantech companies considered to be part of a green wave. To our knowledge, 
this is the first study of underpricing among listings on Euronext Growth. 
We investigate underpricing with regards to both initial day and 30-day abnormal returns and find 
an average abnormal underpricing of 21.45% and 32.15% respectively for each measure. Based on 
previous literature, we identify four hypotheses about underpricing on Euronext Growth. The first 
hypothesis was that underpricing would be higher for the post covid-19 outbreak period, defined 
as a hot market with a high number of listings, compared to the cold market from 2016 until the 
covid-19 outbreak, which had relatively few listings. We do not find evidence that underpricing is 
significantly higher in the latter period with many listings, in contrast to previous research on hot 
markets. 
Our second and third hypotheses were that green and tech companies respectively would be 
associated with higher underpricing. A company was classified as green if its main activities are 
targeted towards directly reducing pollution, greenhouse gases, creating or facilitating renewable 
energy, while the tech classification was based om ICB subsector codes. We find evidence of green 
companies having significantly higher underpricing than non-green companies, with a positive 
underpricing factor of 26.2 percentage points for initial abnormal returns and 53.6 percentage 
points for 30-day abnormal returns, using firm age, size, and market volatility as significant control 
variables. Tech firms, on the other hand, are found to have a weakly negative association with 
initial returns and the variable non-significant with respect to 30-day returns. The latter finding 
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stands in contrast to the high underpricing found in previous research among tech firms in the 
United States, especially during the dotcom bubble (see Michael & Denis (2004) and Walker et al. 
(2015)) and in 2020 (Ritter, 2021). 
The fourth hypothesis was that the presence of cornerstone investors in initial private placements 
would be associated with higher underpricing since less shares need to be sold in the normal 
subscription period and having cornerstones sends a positive signal to the market of the company’s 
prospects. Contrary to previous master theses focusing on Scandinavia (see Grepp & Sørensen 
(2017) and Engman & Pehrson (2017)), we do not find that cornerstone backed offerings are 
positively related to underpricing when controlling for other factors. This finding can possibly be 
explained by the apparent absence of lock up periods for cornerstone investors, which prevent 
investors from selling shares for typically six months or more, on Euronext Growth. 
With this thesis, we extend the literature on IPO underpricing to a new segment of the Norwegian 
market, laying forth evidence of underpricing in initial private placements. Future researchers are 
encouraged to investigate whether the positive association between green companies and 
underpricing holds for a larger sample size and time frame, as well as look into the long-term 
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Appendix 1: Classification of green and tech companies 
As described in section 5.2.2 Green dummy, green companies are classified according to their main 
activities. 
For identification of tech companies, we use specific ICB subsector codes, similar to Loughran and 
Ritter’s (2004) method. The ICB subsector codes presented in Table 15 were used for identification 
of tech companies. 
ICB subsectors for tech identification 
Subsector ICB ICB Code 
Consumer Electronics 40203010 
Electronic Entertainment 40203040 
Electronic Equipment: Gauges and Meters 50202025 
Electronic Equipment: Other 50202040 
Electronic Equipment: Pollution Control 50202030 
Health Care Services 20101025 
Professional Business Support Services 50205020 
Recreational Services 40501030 
Software 10101015 
Telecommunications Equipment 15101010 
Table 15: Subsector ICB codes used for tech identification. 
One can note from the table that subsector 20101025 (Health Care Services), 40501030 
(Recreational Services) and 15101010 (Telecommunications Equipment) will not always include 
tech companies. However, for our dataset, the companies in these sectors were: CSAM Health 
Group, PatientSky Group, Skitude, Cyviz and Huddly. These are all clearly tech companies, such 
that these codes were included, even though this tech identification will not work for all datasets.  
Table 16 shows an overview of all companies in the sample, with the tech and green classifications, 




Table of tech and green classifications 
Company Tech Green Main activities 
ADS Crude Carriers No No Owning and operating tanker vessels 
Agilyx No Yes Recycling of plastics into various products 
Airthings No No Provides air quality monitoring devices and software 
Aker BioMarine No No Harvests and processes krill to different products 
Aker Carbon Capture No Yes Develops carbon capture and storage solutions 
Aker Horizons No Yes Holding company for renewable investments 
Aker Offshore Wind Holding No Yes Source, develop and structure offshore wind projects 
Andfjord Salmon No No Salmon farming 
Arctic Bioscience No No Create dietary products from marine sources 
Arctic Fish Holding No No Salmon farming 
Atlantic Sapphire No No Land-based salmon farming 
ayfie Group No No Text analytics and machine learning services 
BEWi No No Distributes packaging and insulation solutions 
Black Sea Property No No Real estate investing. 
Cambi No Yes Thermal hydrolysis solutions of wastewater 
Cloudberry Clean Energy No Yes Produce renewable energy: Operate hydro- and wind 
power plants 
CSAM Health Group Yes No Provides e-health solutions 
Cyviz Yes No Video conferencing solutions 
Elektroimportøren No No Selling of electrical equipment 
Elliptic Laboratories Yes No Develops sensor solutions for electronic devices 
ELOP Yes No Develops device for scanning concrete structures 
Everfuel No Yes Offers hydrogen fueling solutions for various vehicles 
EXACT Therapeutics No No Develops an ultrasound therapeutic device 
Flyr No No Airline operator 
Gentian Diagnostics No No Developing health diagnostics reagents and materials. 
Grong Sparebank No No General banking and insurance services 
Hexagon Purus No Yes Develops hydrogen cylinders, battery storage systems 
and system integration solutions for fuel cell and battery 
electric drivetrains 
Horisont Energi No Yes Blue hydrogen production 
House of Control Group Yes No Develops business control software 
Huddlestock Fintech Yes No Financial software development 
Huddly Yes No Develops video conferencing cameras 
HydrogenPro No Yes Designs and supplies green hydrogen plants 
Ice Fish Farm No No Owns companies operating in different parts of the 
salmon farming value chain 
Icelandic Salmon No No Salmon farming 
J.P. Kenny Petroleum No No Oil and gas exploration and production 
Kahoot Yes No Educational technology 




Kingfish No No Fish farming 
Lifecare No No Developing a glucose measuring device 
Lillestrøm Sparebank No No General banking services 
Meltwater Yes No Search engine and analytics development 
Mercell Holding Yes No E-tendering and procurement services 
Mintra Holding Yes No E-learning services 
Monobank (Brabank) No No Unsecured lending services 
MPC Container Ships No No Investing in maritime assets; mainly container ships 
MPC Energy Solutions No Yes Renewable energy projects (solar and wind) 
Norcod No No Cod farming 
Nordic Aqua Partners No No Land-based salmon farming 
Nordic Unmanned Yes No Delivers systems to remote control aircrafts 
Nortel No No Telecom provider 
Ocean Sun No Yes Provides water-based solar power plant technology 
OHT No No Heavy offshore transportation services 
Okeanis Eco Tankers No No Owning and operating tanker vessels 
Otovo No Yes Online marketplace for residential solar systems 
PatientSky Group Yes No Delivers e-health solutions 
Play Magnus Yes No Develops and owns chess playing platforms 
Proximar Seafood No No Land-based salmon farming 
Pryme No Yes Recycling of plastic to hydrocarbons, including fuel 
Rana Gruber No No Iron ore mining 
River iGaming p.l.c No No Online casino and lottery applications 
Romsdal Sparebank No No General banking services 
Salmon Evolution Holding No No Land based salmon farming 
Sikri Holding Yes No Provides archive software solutions 
Skandia GreenPower No No Electricity selling company  
Skitude Yes No Delivers and develops software for the ski industry 
Sonans Holding No No Private education provider 
Songa Bulk No No Shipping services 
Sunndal Sparebank No No General banking services 
Surnadal Sparebank No No General banking services 
Tysnes Sparebank No No General banking services 
Volue Yes Yes Develops software solutions targeted mainly towards 
renewable energy producers 
Xplora Technologies Yes No Develops smartwatches for children 
Zaptec Yes Yes Develops and sells electric vehicle chargers 
Zwipe Yes No Contactless and biometrics technology 
 




Appendix 2: Distribution of dependent variables 
A: Initial return 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of initial abnormal returns. 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of ln(IAR+1). 
 
 




Figure 7: Kernel density plots for ln(IAR+1). 
B: 30-day return 
Figure 8: Distribution of 30-day abnormal returns. 
 




Figure 10: Kernel density plots of 30-day abnormal returns. 
 




Appendix 3: Residual plots and tests for auto correlation 
A: Residual plots 
 
Figure 12: Residual plots for initial abnormal returns regression 4. 
The above figure shows four different residual plot for the preferred initial abnormal returns regression (4). The upper left plot is 
the residual vs fitted values plot, which indicates whether the residuals have constant variance. The upper right plot is the normal 
probability plot (qnorm), which indicates whether the residuals are normally distributed. The density plot and histogram indicate 
the distribution of the residuals. 
The residual vs fitted values plot has some outliers to the right but gives reason to believe that 
homoscedasticity assumption can be accepted. There are some deviations from the trend line in the 
normality probability plot, but it otherwise looks okay. The density plot and histogram of the 
residuals do not depict a perfectly normal distribution of the residuals, but the residuals still look 
to be distributed around zero. We run the Breusch Pagan test (see Table 19) to further detect 
homoscedasticity and find that the test statistic is significant at the 10% level. The same regression 




Figure 13: Residual plots for 30-day abnormal returns regression 4. 
The above figure shows four different residual plot for the preferred 30-day abnormal returns regression (4). The upper left plot is 
the residual vs fitted values plot, which indicates whether the residuals have constant variance. The upper right plot is the is the 
normal probability plot (qqnorm), which indicates whether the residuals are normally distributed. The density plot and histogram 
indicate the distribution of the residuals. 
The residual vs fitted for the 30-day regression also has some outliers to the right but mostly looks 
okay. From the normality probability plot, we observe that some observations are not on the line 
while still being acceptable. The density plot and histogram of residuals indicate a distribution that 
is less shaped like a normal distribution compared to the initial return regressions. The Breusch 
Pagan test also reveals a significant test statistic at the 10% level. The same regression with robust 




B: Durbin-Watson test statistics 
  
Table 17: Durbin-Watson test statistics for regressions on initial abnormal returns and 30-day abnormal returns. None of the test 
statistics are statistically significant, and it can be concluded that none of the regressions display autocorrelation in the residuals. 
Appendix 4: Variance Inflation Factor 
 
Table 18: Variance inflation indicator for all independent variables. Values above 5 indicate high correlation. 
. 
Appendix 5: Homoscedasticity 
A: Breusch Pagan test statistics 
 
Table 19: Breusch Pagan test statistics for regression on initial abnormal returns and 30-day abnormal returns. * indicates 
significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
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B: Regressions with robust standard errors 
 
Table 20: Regressions on initial abnormal returns with robust standard errors. 
The accompanying table presents the results of linear regressions assessing the effect of different variables on initial abnormal 
returns in initial private placements on Euronext Growth. The dependent variable ln (IAR+1) is the logged underpricing factor. 
The four independent variables are all dummy variables: a post covid outbreak dummy, a green company dummy, a tech firm 
dummy and a cornerstone investors dummy. The control variables include logarithmic transformations of company value at time 
of listing and firm age, a market volatility measure, as well as dummy variables for OTC listing and GSO. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses below each coefficient. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post covid outbreak 
(dummy) 0.02 0.084 0.082 0.079 0.063
























































(0.059) (0.060) (0.476) (0.480) (0.561)
Observations 74 74 74 74 74
R
2
0.001 0.27 0.387 0.416 0.424
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01







Table 21: Regressions on 30-day abnormal returns with robust standard errors. 
The accompanying table presents the results of linear regressions assessing the effect of different variables on 30-day abnormal 
returns in initial private placements on Euronext Growth. The dependent variable ln (30d AR+1) is the logged underpricing factor. 
The four independent variables are all dummy variables: a post covid outbreak dummy, a green company dummy, a tech firm 
dummy and a cornerstone investors dummy. The control variables include logarithmic transformations of company value at time 
of listing and firm age, a market volatility measure, as well as dummy variables for OTC listing and GSO. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses below each coefficient. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post covid outbreak 
(dummy) 0.034 0.035 0.026 0.022 -0.008









(0.123) (0.117) (0.111) (0.113)
Tech (dummy) -0.042 -0.021 -0.07 -0.078






























(0.096) (0.098) (0.729) (0.757) (0.862)
Observations 74 74 74 74 74
R
2
0.001 0.245 0.32 0.369 0.376
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01





Appendix 6: Medium-term performance 
A: Descriptive statistics on 90-day returns 
 
Table 22: Descriptive statistics on 90-day returns. It includes marked-adjusted 90-day return and the log-transformed variable of 
the market-adjusted 90-day return used in the regressions. 
B: Descriptive statistics on 180-day returns 
 
Table 23: Descriptive statistics on 180-day returns. It includes marked-adjusted 180-day return and the log-transformed variable 
of the market-adjusted 180-day return used in the regressions. 
90d R 90d AR ln(90d AR+1) 90d R 90d AR ln(90d AR+1) 90d R 90d AR ln(90d AR+1)
Mean 75.88% 66.14% 0.26 89.95% 78.96% 0.291 39.14% 32.67% 0.184
Std dev 131.35% 130.79% 0.78 146.15% 146.00% 0.877 71.93% 71.30% 0.425
Min -84.06% -97.85% -3.84 -84.06% -97.85% -3.841 -22.68% -27.59% -0.323
25th percentile -0.24% -6.98% -0.072 4.76% -6.62% -0.068 -2.20% -7.73% -0.080
Median 22.29% 13.26% 0.125 25.61% 22.24% 0.201 10.12% 2.47% 0.024
75th percentile 83.98% 77.80% 0.590 142.00% 128.97% 0.828 76.53% 75.43% 0.562
Max 631.34% 616.75% 1.970 631.34% 616.75% 1.970 259.23% 249.14% 1.250
Kurtosis 5.480 5.463 11.493 3.945 3.912 10.006 4.576 4.315 0.980
Skewness 2.213 2.215 -1.828 1.951 1.954 -1.920 2.105 2.050 1.263
Descriptive statistics on 90-day returns
Full period (65 obs.) Post covid outbreak (47 obs.) Pre covid outbreak (18 obs.)
180d R 180d AR ln(180d AR+1) 180d R 180d AR ln(180d AR+1) 180d R 180d AR ln(180d AR+1)
Mean 68.80% 53.10% 0.194 88.18% 67.77% 0.220 35.40% 27.83% 0.150
Std dev 155.67% 155.88% 0.595 188.30% 189.67% 0.679 63.11% 63.67% 0.427
Min -36.10% -59.86% -0.913 -36.10% -59.86% -0.913 -28.17% -29.41% -0.348
25th percentile 1.00% -14.02% -0.151 4.52% -17.64% -0.194 -0.75% -13.38% -0.144
Median 19.37% 5.83% 0.057 31.00% 13.98% 0.131 3.32% -7.65% -0.080
75th percentile 70.00% 48.20% 0.393 70.00% 48.20% 0.393 84.99% 94.32% 0.664
Max 928.94% 915.29% 2.318 928.94% 915.29% 2.318 199.36% 184.52% 1.046
Kurtosis 19.944 20.016 2.875 13.588 13.651 2.395 1.443 0.678 -0.493
Skewness 4.087 4.086 1.421 3.466 3.473 1.360 1.509 1.352 0.997
Descriptive statistics on 180-day returns
Full period (49 obs.) Post covid outbreak (31 obs.) Pre covid outbreak (18 obs.)
82 
 
C: Regressions on 90-day performance 
 
Table 24: Regressions on 90-day returns. 
The accompanying table presents the results of linear regressions assessing the effect of different variables on 90-day abnormal 
returns in initial private placements on Euronext Growth. The dependent variable ln (90d AR+1) is the logged underpricing factor. 
The factor is calculated in a similar way as the initial and 30-day underpricing factor. The four independent variables are all 
dummy variables: a post covid outbreak dummy, a green company dummy, a tech firm dummy and a cornerstone investors dummy. 
The control variables include logarithmic transformations of company value at time of listing and firm age, a market volatility 
measure, as well as dummy variables for OTC listing and GSO. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below each coefficient. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post covid outbreak 0.144 0.071 0.095 0.076 0.102









(0.160) (0.155) (0.155) (0.159)
Tech (dummy) 0.119 0.103 0.079 0.096
(0.144) (0.142) (0.143) (0.147)
Cornerstone (dummy) -0.347
** -0.153 -0.120 -0.120






















(0.129) (0.112) (1.079) (1.109) (1.262)
Observations 65 65 65 65 65
R
2 0.014 0.299 0.374 0.392 0.399
Adjusted R
2 -0.002 0.252 0.309 0.317 0.300
F Statistic
















(df = 9; 
55)






D: Regressions on 180-day performance 
 
Table 25: Regressions on 180-day returns. 
The accompanying table presents the results of linear regressions assessing the effect of different variables on 180-day abnormal 
returns in initial private placements on Euronext Growth. The dependent variable ln (180d AR+1) is the logged underpricing factor. 
The factor is calculated in a similar way as the initial and 30-day underpricing factor. The four independent variables are all 
dummy variables: a post covid outbreak dummy, a green company dummy, a tech firm dummy and a cornerstone investors dummy. 
The control variables include logarithmic transformations of company value at time of listing and firm age, a market volatility 
measure, as well as dummy variables for OTC listing and GSO. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below each coefficient. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post covid outbreak 0.070 -0.035 -0.071 -0.099 -0.061









(0.193) (0.188) (0.185) (0.193)
Tech (dummy) -0.156 -0.117 -0.162 -0.136
(0.178) (0.176) (0.176) (0.185)
Cornerstone (dummy) -0.220 -0.125 -0.035 -0.053
(0.181) (0.186) (0.192) (0.200)
ln Value -0.071 -0.059 -0.066
(0.061) (0.061) (0.071)









Intercept 0.150 0.159 1.701 0.847 1.027
(0.142) (0.113) (1.231) (1.338) (1.508)
Observations 49 49 49 49 49
R
2 0.003 0.413 0.480 0.507 0.512
Adjusted R
2 -0.018 0.359 0.406 0.423 0.399
F Statistic
















(df = 9; 
39)
Note:
Regression results (OLS)
Dependent variable:
ln (180d AR+1)
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
